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ABSTRACT 
 
 
‘EUROPEANIZATION’ OF THE TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 
THE POST-HELSINKI ERA 
 
 
 
ERDEM AKBAŞ 
 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2008 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
 
Keywords: Turkey’s accession to the European Union, EU conditionalities,           
Europeanization, harmonization packages, National Security Council, civil- military 
relations, democratization 
 
 
   After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey has undergone a process of reform in 
order to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria which were the precondition for launching 
‘accession negotiations’ with the European Union. Thanks to various constitutional 
amendments and ‘harmonization packages’, Turkey managed to adjust its domestic 
political structure in line with the European standards on the basis of Copenhagen 
criteria. Superior position of the Turkish military in civil-military relations was one of 
the most serious problems that needed to be targeted in the post-Helsinki era. As the 
‘guardian’ of Turkish Republic, military has always had a privileged place in the 
Turkish polity. However, this thesis proposes that, as a result of series of institutional 
reforms, especially the ones concerning National Security Council, authority of the 
military over civil agencies has been weakened. In other words, civilianization and 
democratization process of the Turkish political system in the context of 
‘Europeanization’ has given birth to re-arrangement of civil-military relations in favor 
of the former. This thesis explains the reformation process through harmonization 
packages and analyzes the underlying reasons how and why the Turkish military, a very 
powerful actor in the Turkish political arena, has accepted its loss of power vis-à-vis the 
civilians.      
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRK SİYASİ SİSTEMİNİN ‘AVRUPALILAŞMASI’ VE HELSİNKİ 
SONRASI DÖNEMDE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİN EVRİMİ 
 
 
 
ERDEM AKBAŞ 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2008 
                                                                          
                                                                       
Danışman : Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği, AB koşulları, Avrupalılaşma, 
uyum paketleri, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, sivil-asker ilişkileri, demokratikleşme 
 
 
     1999 Helsinki  Zirvesi sonrası Türkiye, katılım müzakerelerine başlanabilmesi için 
yerine getirilmesi zorunlu olan Kopenhag kriterlerine ulaşmak adına yoğun bir reform 
süreci içine girmiştir. Adı geçen zirve sonrası gerçekleştirilen pek çok anayasa 
değişikliği ve uyum paketleri sayesinde, Türkiye kendi iç siyasi yapısını Kopenhag 
kriterlerine uyumlu hale getirmeyi başarmıştır. Askerin sivil-asker ilşkilerindeki 
üstünlüğü Helsinki Zirvesi sonrasında Avrupa ile uyumlulaştırılması gereken en önemli 
konulardan biri olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin savunucusu olarak 
asker, Türk siyasi sistemi içiresinde her zaman ayrıcalıklı bir yere sahip olmuştur. 
Ancak, bu tezde de ileri sürüldüğü üzere, özellikle Milli Güvenlik Kurulu’nu hedef alan 
reformlar sonrasında askerin sivil kurum ve kuruluşlar üzerindeki otoritesi 
kısıtlanmıştır. Bir diğer deyişle, ‘Avrupalılaşma’ üst başlığı kapsamında, sivilleşme ve 
demokratikleşme süreçleri ile birlikte, sivil-asker ilişkilerindeki güç dengesi sivillerin 
leyhine olacak biçimde bozulmuştur. Bu tez Avrupa Birliği’ne uyum paketlerini 
inceleyerek Türkiye’nin içinden geçtiği reform sürecini açıklamakta ve askerin siviller 
karşısında kendi gücünü kısıtlayan reformları kabul etmesinin altında yatan nedenleri 
analiz etmektedir.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
“[This] reform package has rendered the MGK [Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu] functionless. Political Islam and ethnic 
separatism remain to be serious threats. The appointment of a 
civilian secretary general to that body politicizes it. One 
should not have weakened the MGK for the sake of 
democracy and the EU [European Union].”1  
 
 
 
When the accession negotiations between the European Union (EU) and Turkey 
began on October 3, 2005, it had been nearly half a century since Turkey first applied 
for associate membership in 1959. Turkey’s pending expectations began to come into 
existence in 1999 when the EU, in its Helsinki European Council meeting, accepted 
Turkey as a candidate state for membership to the European Union. This development 
has focused European attention on the country’s domestic policies which, immediately, 
needed to be redesigned in order to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria for EU 
membership. One of the most serious domestic issues that needed to be targeted was the 
position of the Turkish military in civil –military relations and its prominent role in 
Turkish political system. In this sense, this thesis proposes that, with the various 
constitutional amendments passed after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, civil-military 
relations in Turkey has been reshaped in favor of the former and the role of the military 
in domestic politics has been curbed.    
 
Since Turkey was deemed not yet ready to be a part of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1959, she was offered an “association” instead of “accession”. 
Subsequently, the Ankara Agreement of 1963, which still constitutes the legal basis of 
the association between Turkey and the EU, was signed in Brussels. Ankara Agreement 
secured financial assistance to Turkey and envisaged free circulation of goods, persons, 
capital and services between the EEC and Turkey. Hence, the Association Agreement 
was understood as a prelude to membership and the Turkish-EEC integration was 
                                                 
1
 Milliyet, August 25, 2003 
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thought to be making progress rapidly in the post agreement era.2 However, due to 
Turkey’s chaotic domestic situation in the 1960s and 1970s and because of various 
military interventions throughout this period, Turkey’s route from “association” towards 
“accession” has been fairly slow. Military rule, which was established after the 1980 
coup d’etat, ended in 1983 when civilian power was restored under the leadership of 
Turgut Özal, who was still the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic when Turkey 
applied for full membership in 1987. In response to Turkey’s application, the European 
Commission declared its Opinion on December 18, 1989. Owing to serious economic 
and political problems, the European Commission recommended against Turkey’s 
application. In spite of its negative opinion in regard to the Turkey’s full membership, 
the European Commission implied its willingness to make Turkey remain in the path by 
embracing a comprehensive program for the integration of Turkey into the Customs 
Union. Therefore, the Customs Union Agreement was signed on March 6, 1995 and 
came into force on January 1, 1996. Yet, this relatively warm relations between the 
Union and Turkey transformed into tumultuous relations when Turkey was once again 
left out of the list of candidates for EU membership in the European Council’s 
Luxembourg Summit in 1997. It was not until the Helsinki Summit in 1999 that the 
candidacy of Turkey for EU membership was recognized by the European Council. The 
candidacy has created a wind of optimism in Turkey which enabled a process of 
dramatic change in the fields of domestic and foreign policy domains throughout the 
post Helsinki era. Eventually, these reforms has satisfied the political aspects of 
Copenhagen Criteria, a precondition for the opening of accession negotiations, and 
paved the way to the opening of the accession negotiations. However, unlike previous 
accession processes, Turkey inaugurated negotiations without resolving highly sensitive 
political issues related with internal and external dynamics.3 
 
This thesis acknowledges the multiple issues and obstacles that lie in front of 
Turkey ranging from Cyprus issue in the foreign policy domain to various 
democratization problems in the domestic realm. These internal and external issues are 
                                                 
2
 L. A. Glyptis, (2005) “The Cost of Rapprochement: Turkey’s Erratic EU Dream as a Clash of Systemic 
Values” Turkish Studies Vol. 6 No.3  pp.401-420 
3
 These external and internal issues would include Cyprus question,  Aegean dispute with Greece, the 
Armenian issue, restructuring of northern Iraq; Kurdish minority rights, human rights and democracy, 
Islamic fundamentalism, and lastly the autonomy of the Turkish armed forces within the state and society. 
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likely to cross Turkey’s path to full membership on particular occasions. These being 
said, this thesis isolates one main variable and focuses on that specific variable; namely, 
civil-military relations  in Turkey. This does not mean other issues are unimportant, but 
only that they are beyond the scope of this thesis. Autonomy of the Turkish armed 
forces within the state and society has been one of the main concerns of the European 
Union. Turkish military has intervened in politics by curbing the power and authority of 
civilian governments many times. Military has had the capability to shape domestic and 
foreign policies on the basis of its understanding of ‘national security’ not only by 
directly ruling the country, but also influencing civilian governments through various 
ways. This predominant position of the military in civil- military relations has been 
challenged by various constitutional amendments and harmonization packages in the 
post Helsinki period. This thesis deals with the re-positioning of the military in 
domestic politics and the evolution of the civil-military relations in Turkey as a 
consequence of Turkey’s bid to become a full member of the EU.    
 
      Despite the fact that the EU is not the only factor that has induced the reform 
process in Turkey, it is irrefutable that without the adaptational pressure of the Union 
such a dramatic transformation would be unthinkable.4 The reform process began in 
1999 and speeded up in 2002 in line with the EU standards. More specifically, 
throughout the post-Helsinki era Turkey has undergone a process of progressive and 
democratic change both in domestic and foreign policy areas. As long as the domestic 
issues are concerned, the preceding government under the rule of Bülent Ecevit 
approved 34 constitutional amendments most of which were related with the areas of 
human rights. These constitutional amendments were followed by nine harmonization 
packages between 2001 and 2006.5 The first two packages brought amendments in the 
freedoms of expression and association. The third harmonization package abolished 
highly contentious death penalty application and lifted the prohibition on broadcasting 
and education in other languages like Kurdish. The laws on political parties, penalties 
for torture crimes were amended with the fourth and fifth harmonization packages. Two 
packages passed in 2003 amended the law of the National Security Council (NSC), 
                                                 
4
 M. Müftüler-Baç, (2005) “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union” South 
European Society and Politics vol.10 no.01 pp.17-31 
5
 To access the Harmonization Packages in Turkish, see the Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate 
General of Press and information, http://www.byegm.gov.tr  
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which used to be dominated by the military. The number of participants from the 
Turkish armed forces was reduced while the number of civilians was increased. This 
amendment is also known as the ‘civilianization of the NSC (analyzed further in 
Chapter 3). Besides the NSC, sixth and seventh packages also extended freedom of 
speech and association; as well as cultural, religious and linguistic rights. The second 
phase of constitutional amendments that changed ten articles of the constitution was 
passed in 2004. These amendments civilianized the Higher Education Board (YÖK) and 
abolished State Security Courts (SSC). Both institutions were the products of 1982 
Constitution promulgated after the coup d’etat on September 12, 1980. Furthermore, 
constitutional amendments in 2004 also strengthened gender equality and the authority 
of the president was curtailed. This second set of constitutional amendments was 
followed by the eighth harmonization package which implemented these amendments. 
Lastly, the ninth harmonization package, which included a series of bills on 
foundations, a new ombudsman mechanism and the Supreme Court of Public Accounts, 
was accepted in 2006. Internal reforms are not the only such reforms; it is also possible 
to observe a similar process in the foreign policy areas as well. 
 
      These changes in Turkey would be analyzed within the larger framework of 
“Europeanization”. In this thesis, “Europeanization” refers to the impact of European 
Union institutions and practices over domestic political structures and policies.6 In other 
words, Europeanization is used as changes in legal areas, aspects and policy making.7 
Therefore, as Olsen (2002) puts it, it would be plausible to envisage Europeanization as 
a “set of ordinary processes of change”.8 Throughout the post-Helsinki era Turkey has 
undergone a dramatic reform process in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. 
Repercussions of this ‘Europeanization’ process can be observed both in domestic and 
foreign policy areas. Despite the fact that Turkey has made significant progress to start 
accession negotiations with the European Union, current slowness of the process in 
comparison to the other candidate country, Croatia, implies that aforementioned reforms 
and amendments needs to be applied and implemented properly. Otherwise, 
                                                 
6
 C. Knill and D. Lehmkuhl, (2002) “The national impact of European Union regulatory policy: Three 
Europeanization mechanisms” European Journal of Political Research Vol. 41 pp. 255-280 
7
 Varying understandings of ‘Europeanization’ will be provided in Chapter 1 
8
 J. P. Olsen, (2002) “The Many Faces of Europeanization” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 40 
No. 5 pp. 921-952 
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incompetency in applying and implementing reforms would result in unprecedented 
pauses in Turkey’s trip to Europe. Liberalization and democratization of the political 
regime, as prescribed by the EU, needs to be maintained by means of passing and 
implementing reforms in line with the Acquis. In this sense, role of the military in 
Turkish political system attracts great importance. One of the most controversial issues 
that would give birth to dissension between Turkey and the European Union is the 
special place that the Turkish armed forces occupy within the political system. Because, 
as Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) point out, Turkish military’s power considerations 
would give rise to violation of ‘democratic conditionalities’, that the European Union 
expects Turkey to satisfy, to acquire the full membership to the Union.9 From the 
Turkish Armed Forces’ perspective, the EU demands in regard to civilianization, 
democratization are designed to undermine the foundations of military’s power which, 
in turn, puts the internal security of Turkey under threat.10 Military elite fears that 
further democratization would give Kurdish minority an opportunity to gain their 
autonomy and pave way to the disintegration of the state.11 Besides Kurdish minority 
problem, another concern is the rise of political Islam. Turkish military legitimizes its 
intervention into politics by arguing that military is the most reliable actor to fight 
against disintegration of the state and political Islam.12 However, political preconditions 
that must be fulfilled by Turkey to gain successful integration into the Union contradicts 
with the military’s expanded influence over Turkey’s political development and its 
autonomy from civilian actors. The European Commission’s stance on this issue was 
explicitly expressed in the Progress Report 2001: 
 
                                                 
9
 F. Schimmelfennig, F. Engert & H. Knobel, (2003) “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: the impact of 
EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 
41 No. 3 p. 507 
10
 ibid. 
11
 A. Güney and P. Karatekelioğlu, (2005) “Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: 
Challenges and Prospects” Armed Forces & Society Vol. 31 No. 3 p.455 
12
 As the Chief of Turkish Staff Gen. Yasar Buyukanit states: “Turkish Armed Forces is the guarantee of 
the immortality of the nation” Hürriyet, 18 March 2007 
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 “The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a 
number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the 
military, remain to be effectively addressed.”13 
 
       Furthermore, the Copenhagen Criteria, which encapsulated complete freedom of 
expression, the entrenchment of human rights, respect and protection for minority 
rights, require extended democratic control over the military structure. Thus, after the 
Helsinki Summit, one of the most important agendas for Turkey was to execute 
structural changes in the organization of civil military relations in order to enhance 
civilian control and to bring the institutional structure in line with the EU standards. 
Thanks to a good number of amendments to existing constitution, several changes in 
regard to the role of military and democratic control over its performance have been 
realized. Especially, the seventh harmonization package in 2003 brought democratic 
changes in the National Security Council Law of 1983 by restructuring the composition 
and role of the NSC and Secretariat General. According to the European Union 
Commission, as a result of these reforms: 
 
 “…the government has increasingly asserted its control over the 
military. [Moreover,] the reforms over the last year concerning the 
functioning of the NSC have further shifted the balance civil-military 
relations towards the civilians and encouraged public debate in this 
area.”14  
 
      On the other hand, some scholars would argue that the constitutional reforms are 
not likely to affect civil-military relations in favor of the former, because there are many 
socio-political variables which ensure the privileged position of the Turkish military in 
the political life.15 According to this perspective reduction in the role of the military is 
not possible by merely adopting institutional changes; there is a need for an overall 
                                                 
13
 European Union Commission Progress Report, 2001. To access Progress Reports in Turkish and 
English, see http://www.abgs.gov.tr  
14
 European Union Commission Progress Report, 2004 
15
 Ü.C. Sakallıoglu, 2004 “Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and 
the European Union enlargement zone” European Journal of Political Research vol.43 
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evolutionary process of cultural change which would dissolve the legitimizing factors of 
the autonomy and superiority of the military. 
 
      Since the aim of this thesis is to analyze the Europeanization of Turkey by 
putting lens specifically over the Turkish armed forces, in the lights of different 
institutional change theories, this dramatic transformation of the military through the 
Europeanization process will be assesed. In the first chapter, theoretical framework of 
the thesis will be presented. Various definitions of ‘Europeanization’ and competing 
models of ‘change’ embraced by different theoretical approaches will be mentioned. 
Chapter two provides the background information about the dynamics of civil-military 
relations in Turkey. In this chapter, role of the military in the Turkish political system 
will be analyzed by touching upon cornerstone events (military interventions in 1960, 
1971, 1980 and the soft interventions of 1997, 2007) in the Turkish history. In chapter 
three, Turkey’ transformation, especially in the field of civil-military relations, will be 
examined by tracing constitutional amendments, harmonization packages and 
commission reports. Lastly, concluding remarks will be provided in chapter four.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
THEORIZING THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
1.1 Nature of the European Integration and Theorizing Europeanization 
 
 As the EU continuous to enlarge its borders by integrating new member states 
and expand authority and competence of its supranationational institutions over the 
national governments, discussions about the nature and future of the Union deepens. 
Widening and deepening of the EU also brings about the question of adaptation to the 
European laws, regulations, norms and values. This process of adaptation of the 
member states and candidate states to the European standards is known as 
‘Europeanization’. This chapter provides a discussion about the nature of the EU and 
presents different theoretical approaches to ‘Europeanization’.   
 
 
 
1.1.1 Understanding the Nature of Enlarged Union 
 
 
      Integration of the East-European countries into the European Union as a result of 
the last enlargement waves has exacerbated two main discussions within the European 
Union literature. Firstly, from the very beginning of the European project in the 1930s, 
the main idea in the minds of pioneers of the project was to create a “United States of 
Europe”16, similar to the United States of America. Some thinkers, like the former 
foreign minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer, who describe the nature of the Union 
from a state-centric paradigm, believe that today’s enlarged Europe is the footstep of a 
kind of Westphalian federation with a central government. According to those, the 
European integration process is the continuation of state-building process that followed 
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. From this point of view, enlargement and further 
integration imply that the European Union is, step by step, possessing the main 
characteristics of a Westphalian state which has a central government, clearly defined 
                                                 
16
 Having been inspired by Winston Churchill’s popular speech at Zurich University  in 1946, many 
federalists started to raise their voices for the propagation of “United States of Europe”. 
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external borders, common currency, constitution, citizenship, and legitimate means of 
coercion.17 
 
           On the other hand, some other scholars like Zielonka (2006) and Bartolini (2005) 
are not only opposed to the above mentioned state-centric approach, but also they argue 
that employing statist terms and analogies in theorizing European integration is quite 
misleading, because the European Union is anything but a state.18 Zielonka, who 
challenges state-centric approach by presenting an alternative paradigm called: “Neo-
Medieval paradigm”, points out that the European Union does not have an unanimously 
accepted center of authority with the legitimate means of coercion. Furthermore, as 
Zielonka emphasizes, new members coming from eastern Europe with communist roots 
have enormous dissimilarities with west European member states in terms of culture, 
political structures, social behaviors; and these differences are at odds with the state 
centric approaches.19 
 
 
“...the Union is a very different kind of international actor than any of 
the states we know from history. The last wave of enlargement has 
not made the Union look more like a state. On the contrary, 
enlargement has resulted in more layers of authority, more cultural, 
legal, and political pluralism, more diversified and cross-cutting 
institutional arrangements”20 
                                                        
      
      As Bartolini mentions, Westphalian states have relatively fixed and hard 
borders.21 Moreover, the physical geographical border of the state coincides with 
functional boundaries such as economic, cultural, politico-administrative and force 
coercion boundaries. This overlapping boundaries minimize exit opportunities for 
groups and individuals with the help of activities and initiatives of a “central political 
                                                 
17
 J. Zielonka, (2006) “Europe as Empire” Oxford University Press. p. 3 
18
 ibid. 
19
 ibid. 
20
 ibid. p:3 
21
 S. Bartolini, (2005) “Restructuring Europe” Oxford University Press pp. 12-13 
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hierarchy”. However, in the European Union there is neither a clearly defined external 
border of the polity, nor can we speak of coincidence of functional boundaries and 
external border like the one in states.22 In addition to this, soft borders which make the 
exit option for groups and individuals more attainable, combined with weak 
commonalities to establish a European identity that would be embraced by all 
Europeans give birth to weaknesses in system building and political structuring under 
the roof of the Union. This, in turn, according the Bartolini and Zielonka, makes the 
Union different from a superstate envisaged by federalists. 
 
      Therefore, as the European integration deepens, both in terms of vertical and 
horizontal dimensions, the nature of the Union tends to blur and it becomes more 
difficult to reach a consensus. Some politicians like Joschka Fisher, with the idea of 
united Europe in their minds tend to perceive continuing integration process as the 
harbinger of a federal Europe under which member states pool their sovereignties 
accepting the authority of a supranational organization. On the other side, there are 
some scholars (like Zielonka and Bartolini) who challenge the ontology of the above 
mentioned state-centric paradigm by arguing that the European Union has many 
dissimilarities from nation states and today’s enlarging Europe cannot be understood 
from modern state perspective. Hence, it is even not easy to find a straightforward, 
commonly agreed description of the enlarged Union. As the Union integrated new 
countries into its structure, the process of adaptation of several countries - with different 
traditions and backgrounds- to the EU standards began to attract greater attention. 
Candidates and already member states continuously readjust their domestic systems 
through constitutional and legal changes in order to comply with the EU’s demand. The 
framework to analyze the process of change in the political structures of the member 
states and those who aspire for membership is known as “Europeanization”.       
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 For a deeper understanding of ‘boundary-exit mechanism’ and their application to territorial units in 
Europe see S. Rokkan, (1999) “State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe” in The 
Theory of Stein Rokkan edited by Peter Flora, Stein Kuhle, and Derek Urwin Oxford University Press, 
1999 
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1.1.2 Theorizing Europeanization 
 
      The main tool to analyze the impact of the EU on candidate states is the theory 
of Europeanization. “Europeanization” has become a widespread political phenomenon 
since the European integration process in Central and Eastern European countries began 
in the 1990s. Although there is an increasing academic interest on “Europeanization”, 
most of the theoreticians argue that the concept has not been clearly defined and the 
meaning is ambiguous.23 For instance, Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999, 2002) argue that 
“notwithstanding a growing number of studies explicitly concerned with the 
Europeanization of domestic institutions, we still lack consistent and systematic 
concepts to account for the varying patterns of institutional adjustment across countries 
and policy sectors”.24 Furthermore, Olsen (2003) points out that “Europeanization” is a 
newly born area of study and current research about this field do not constitute a 
convincing theoretical framework of institutional change25 (analyzed further below).  
 
      Since there is no universally accepted definition to Europeanization, confusion 
in the literature becomes unavoidable and different scholars assign different meanings 
to the concept. This situation gives way to misinformation, conceptual stretching, and 
degreeism. As the term is stretched by attaching different meanings to it, the value of 
the term is declined.26 Hence, to avoid stretching, the concept needs to be defined 
clearly by drawing its boundaries and showing what is inside and what falls outside.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
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1.1.2.1 Definition(s) of ‘Europeanization’ as a Concept   
    
      There are competing definitions of Europeanization offered by different 
theoreticians. One of the frequently quoted definitions of the Europeanization comes 
from Caporaso, Green-Cowles and Risse: 
 
“We define Europeanization as the emergence and the development 
at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of 
political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem-solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of 
policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules”27 
 
      Here, Caporaso et al. see Europeanization as an independent variable which 
directly affects domestic processes, policies and institutions. According to Checkel, 
Caporaso et al.’s definition includes ‘both the strengthening of an organizational 
capacity for collective action and the development of common ideas, such as new 
norms, and collective understandings regarding citizenship and membership’.28 In other 
words, Europeanization, according to their point of view, is political institutionalization 
which involves the formation of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms and 
practices governing politics at the European, national and sub-national levels.29 The 
main point which differentiates this definition from traditional definitions of 
Europeanization is the recognition of the interactions among various domains of 
governance (national, sub-national, supra-national).30 Early on, Europeanization was 
used synonymous with “institution-building at the European level”.31 Subsequently, 
scholars like Olsen (1995) began to analyze Europeanization from the point of domestic 
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changes triggered by the activities undertaken in Brussels.32 Andersen and Eliassen 
(1993) preferred the term ‘Europeification’, rather than Europeanization, in explaining 
the impact of the change at the European level to the national political institutions and 
policymaking styles of member states.33 It was not until Kohler-Koch (1997) that the 
term Europeanization was used in order to refer sub-national levels as well as national 
and supra-national levels. Kohler-Koch and Eising examined the domestic 
implementation of European rules and regulations from the perspective of the regional 
governments, policies and outcomes.34 Nevertheless, as Risse et al. argue, their 
definition is the most systematic and comprehensive explanation of Europeanization, 
which analyzes “why, how, and under what conditions Europeanization shapes a variety 
of domestic structures (including supra-national, national, and sub-national levels) in a 
number of countries”.35 Being strongly affected from historical institutionalism, the 
rationale behind their definition is that, institutions are always in a process of change, 
and this evolution is experienced sometimes slowly and piecemeal, sometimes rapidly 
and comprehensively. Furthermore, this change in institutional structure of the 
European Union is very likely to have effects over the existing domestic institutions. 
Although the possibility of intersection between the institutional change at the European 
level and existing domestic structures is eminent, institutional adaptation and the 
evolution of the domestic institutional structures in line with the European desires are 
path dependent.36 Because, adaptational pressure exerted by Europeanization does not 
necessarily result in domestic change, since mediating factors - like national and 
subnational actors - may simply avoid taking certain actions for different reasons.  
 
Radaelli (2000, 2003) finds Risse et al.’s definition as an extremely broad 
version of Europeanization.37 He argues that the Europeanization has to have a more 
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precise and selective meaning rather than employing concepts like policy networks, EU 
policy formation and EU integration, which are used with wide latitude.38  
 
      An alternative definition to Europeanization is developed by Ladrech in the early 
1990s. Ladrech (1994) uses Europeanization as the “process” and mechanisms by which 
European institution building may cause change at the domestic level. According to 
Ladrech, Europeanization means an: 
 
“…incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of 
politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics 
become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy 
making”39 
 
      Ladrech’s definition of Europeanization puts the main emphasis on reorientation 
of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.40 By the ‘changes in 
the organizational logic of politics and policymaking’ he means the adaptive processes 
of organizations (including governmental and non-governmental organizations) to a 
modified environment. Therefore, according to his description, if we equate the EU with 
an international regime, and generalize member and/or candidate states’ political 
parties, organized interest groups, and certain administrative agencies and governmental 
units as organizational actors; Ladrech, then assumes that, organizations respond to 
changes in the perceptions of interest and value that occur in the principles, norms, and 
institutional design of the regime in which they are embedded.41 Hence, while re-
orienting their national politics, as a response to the European Union, states internalize 
new EU generated inputs through adaptation, learning, and policy change. 
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      It is plausible to argue that, Ladrech’s definition challenges the traditional 
monopoly of intergovernmentalists and institutionalists in the literature by moving his 
analysis away from both approaches: 
 
       “The difference between the approach employed in this article 
and neo-functionalism and federalism on the one hand, neo-realism 
(intergovernmentalism) on the other is a recognition of the continuing 
validity of national politics, yet of a transformed nature. Neo-
functionalism and federalism tend to privilege the supranational level 
of decision making, whether as part of an incremental process 
redirecting activities and allegiances on in a qualitative leap to the 
“EC as federal state”. Europeanization preserves the legitimacy and 
authority of national government, but suggest that it will become 
permeated by environmental inputs which become, over time 
internalized in politics and policy-making. This is at odds with neo-
realism in that national or state interests are traditionally defined to 
the exclusion of other dimensions of political activity external to the 
national state. Rather the implications of Europeanization would 
suggest inclusion of multiple actors, external as well as internal” 
(emphasis added)42 
 
      Claudio Radaelli agrees with Ladrech in many aspects, however, he finds the 
latter’s definition problematic in the sense that it pays too much emphasis on 
organizations which would in turn clouds the role of individuals and policy 
entrepreneurs.43 Moreover, he mentions that, in Ladrech’s definition the object of 
Europeanization is limited to “national politics and policy-making” by neglecting 
identities and the cognitive component of politics.44 Borrowing Ladrech’s definition, he 
defines the term Europeanization as following: 
 
     “Process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
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norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU 
decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, 
identities, political structures, and public policies”45 
                                                                                                                          
      This definition stresses the importance of change in the logic of political 
behavior. Europeanization involves the domestic assimilation of EU policy and politics, 
hence the definition refers to processes of institutitonalization.46 Unlike Ladrech’s 
definition Radaelli does not touch on organizations. Instead of merely highlighting 
organizations, his definition accommodates both organizations and individuals. In 
addition to this, he prefers to use “EU public policy” rather than EU laws or decisions 
because the former covers “modes of governance that are not targeted towards law 
making, such as the open method of coordination”47 
 
      To be more specific about the term Europeanization, it is beneficial to draw its 
boundaries by analyzing not only what falls inside the frame, but also what falls outside 
it. In other words, after discussing about the inputs that needs to be included when 
defining Europeanization, it is now crucial to isolate the term from other concepts 
which, most of the time, are employed synonymous with Europeanization.  
 
      Above all, Europeanization is not same with convergence.48 If Europeanization 
is simply understood as the penetration of EU policy into the domestic political systems 
it becomes difficult to detach the term Europeanization from other contiguous concepts 
like convergence. Since Europeanization is a process of learning, adaptation and 
institutionalization; convergence can be the consequence of this process. Having said 
that, it is essential to note here, Europeanization ‘process’ does not necessarily lead up 
to ‘convergence’. It can also produce ‘divergence’.49 Although Europeanization has 
resulted in convergence in the areas of environmental policy, media ownership policy; 
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the Europeanization of transport policy led to striking differences between France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK.50  
 
“In contrast to the British and the Italian case, France and Germany 
were characterized by a relatively more even distribution of 
power... As a result of the differences in the domestic 
constellations, however, the outcomes in each country were 
different... As our case studies have shown, however, to identify a 
particular mechanisms of Europeanization is not to describe its 
actual effect. Rather the range of policy outcomes stretches from 
hard core de-regulation in Britain to social re-regulation in 
France”51 
 
      Europeanization should not be confused with harmonization either. 
Europeanization does not necessarily homogenize states. As Motpetit (2000) concludes, 
although it is common for all states that Europeanization encourages them to undertake 
domestic policy change, not all member states prefer the same types of change.52 Thus, 
it is safe to argue that, the nature of Europeanization would be to harmonize states; 
however, Europeanization does not necessarily result in harmonization for states that 
are exposed to this process. Furthermore, Europeanization is not same with political 
integration. Political integration is related with the process of transfer of sovereignty 
from member states to a supranational entity. Political integration belongs to the 
ontological stage of research. It focuses on if or not the European integration 
strengthens the state. On the other hand, Europeanization is a post-ontological stage of 
research which deals with more specific questions like the role of domestic institutions 
in the process of adaptation to Europe.53 
 
   Thus, in the light of the various definitions mentioned above, one would 
conclude that Europeanization has different domains. Claudio Radaelli analyzes 
Europeanization in three domains: i) domestic structures, ii) public policy, iii) cognitive 
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and normative dimensions.54 Europeanization affects domestic structures of the 
countries. In this sense, Europeanization is the impact of the EU oriented policies and 
actions over the domestic structures including the political and legal structures of a 
country (e.g. institutions, political parties, intergovernmental relations...etc.). Moreover, 
Europeanization has effect over the public policy domain as well. Here, 
Europeanization means adaptation of the states to the European standards with the 
transformation of different elements of the public policy, such as, actors, resources, and 
policy instruments. In addition to these, Europeanization also means emergence of 
formal-legal institutions of governance at the European level. In this context, 
Europeanization implies formation of formal and informal rules, procedures and 
practices at the European, national and sub-national levels. Therefore, ‘there is the 
simple observation that not only can Europe affect formal political structures, it can also 
influence the values, norms, and discourses in member states’.55 However, in this thesis 
Europeanization covers the first two domains of the concept. Therefore, 
Europeanization refers to changes and transformations within the domestic structure and 
public policy instruments of Turkey as a response to the policies of the European Union. 
 
Source: C.M. Radaelli, (2003) p. 35 
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                         Domains of Europeanization   
  
 
    
  
Domestic Structures Public Policy 
 
Cognitive and normative 
structures 
1.Political Structures a) Actors  a) Discourse 
a) Institutions b) Policy problems  b) Policy Problems 
b) Public administration c) Style  c) Political legitimacy 
c) Intergovernmental relations d) Instruments  d) Identities 
d) Legal structure 
 
e) Resources  
2.Structures of representation and 
cleavages 
   
e) State traditions-understanding of 
governance 
f) Policy paradigms, frames and 
narratives 
a) Political parties 
b) Pressure groups 
    
c) Societal-cleavage structures       
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1.1.2.2. How does Europeanization Result in Change? 
 
      As it is mentioned above, initially Europeanization and European integration 
processes have been mainly studied on the basis of “bottom-up” perspective. In other 
words, debate between rival theories like neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, and 
multi-level governance have centered around the question of how to construe the 
emerging  European polity above the member states. Development of a European 
literature which analyzes the impact of European integration and Europeanization from 
the perspective of domestic political and social processes of the member states is a 
newly born approach. Therefore, one could argue that Europeanization literature has 
shifted from “bottom-up” perspective to “top-down” perspective.56 As Börzel and Risse 
(2000) concludes, studying Europeanization according to “top-down” perspective is 
necessary to fully capture how Europe and the EU enforce domestic change within the 
legal and political structures of the member and candidate states. It would be beneficial 
to note here, in this thesis, Europeanization is understood as a “top-down” process 
which refers to domestic impacts of European policies, activities and institutions.   
 
      It has been mentioned above that the process of Europeanization gives birth to 
drastic changes in the domestic political structures and policies. Therefore, the key word 
in understanding Europeanization is: “change”. As Olsen concludes, it is plausible to 
frame Europeanization as a ‘set of ordinary processes of change’.57 In this sense, in 
order to fully capture the meaning of Europeanization it is crucial to understand the 
dynamics and mechanisms of institutional change in the domestic realm.58 For the sake 
of clarity, it would be useful to give the definition of ‘institutional change’. Generally, 
‘institution’ is deemed ‘as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining 
appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations’.59 In this 
manner, political institutions are based and built on rules, principles, values and 
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collective identities. Since these rules, principles, collective identities, and values are 
the main pillars of the structure of an institution, any kind of alteration in one of these 
main pillars would lead to dramatic transformations in the nature of an institution. As 
Sarıgil concludes, ‘a gradual or dramatic shift in the norms, principles, values, and 
collective identity of an institution qualify as an institutional change since the defining 
element of an institution takes different forms’.60 Thus, this thesis analyzes the reform 
process from an institutional perspective by studying the adaptation of the Turkish 
military to the European standards through various constitutional amendments and 
harmonization laws (in Chapter 3). 
 
      Hence, domestic change is the essence of Europeanization. But, what are the 
conditions for domestic change, when and how does institutional change take place? 
There are two stages of change. At first, the process of change is inflamed by an internal 
or external factor. Secondly, institutional actors begin to negotiate about new 
establishments in exchange for the status-quo.61 As Börzel and Risse continue, ‘change’ 
becomes a necessity when there is an inconvenience or some degree of ‘misfit’ between 
domestic applications, processes, and institutions, on the one hand,  and European-level 
processes, policies and institutions on the other.62 Similarly, the degree of 
incompatibility or ‘misfit’ determines the intensity of ‘adaptational pressure’ posed by 
the EU. Thus, the process of change is triggered by the enforcement of the EU which 
aims to adjust existing domestic political structures in line with European standards. 
However, the presence of ‘misfit’ between domestic political structures and European 
level institutions does not necessarily result in change. For change to be realized, there 
must be some ‘facilitating factors’, such as political actors and/or institutions, which not 
only respond to adaptational pressures coming from the EU but also do not hesitate to 
compete and negotiate for an alternative formation.63  
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       “...institutional actors who desire more favorable distributional 
outcome would consider shifts in power structures as an opportunity 
to alter existing institutional arrangements. Thus, shifts in power 
structures emerge as one significant factor that initiates the process of 
change. However, this factor does not determine the outcome of 
change process since the initiation of change leads to bargaining in 
the second stage, during which different dynamics and factors play a 
role.”64   
 
 
1.2. Review of Theoretical Approaches to Institutional Change 
 
Institutions affect policy outcomes and the policy making powers held by 
institutional actors. These actors have preferences over institutions and they compete 
and bargain with each other in order to bring about their preferred versions of 
institutions. In that sense, institutional change refers to either the creation of new rules 
or making changes in the existing rules. Therefore, institutional change paves way to the 
reallocation of power by challenging the existing power structure and rendering each 
actors more or less able to achieve its own policy preferences. The ‘Logic of 
consequentialism’ and the ‘Logic of appropriateness’ are the two competing approaches 
which attempt to theorize the decision making process of the actors in the times of 
institutional change. 
 
 
1.2.1 Rationalist Institutionalism and the “Logic of Consequences” 
 
      Theoretically speaking, once existing power structure has been challenged by 
adaptational pressure, institutional actors which interact within this power structure 
begin to compete in order to be a major part of the new order.65 There are two models of 
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approach to domestic adaptational processes as far as the priorities of institutional actors 
are taken into account. These are the ‘Logic of Consequentialism’ and the ‘Logic of 
Appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1998; Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; Hall and 
Taylor, 1996; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). According to the 
‘logic of consequentialism’ (LoC), which is central to ‘rationalist institutionalist 
perspective’66 (rational choice approach), incompatibility between European and 
domestic institutions, policies and processes leads to the enforcement of adaptational 
pressure by the former which in turn result in emergence of opportunity structures for 
domestic political actors so as to satisfy their interests. In short, according to this model, 
facilitating actors bargain with each other in order to have an upper hand in the 
distribution of material utilities.67 Therefore, ‘the logic of rationalist institutionalism 
suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through a differential 
empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic 
level’68 According to rationalist institutionalism actors have fixed preferences and their 
main aim is to satisfy their self-interests. Under this perspective, the process of change 
gives actors an opportunity to maximize their self interests on the basis of their 
preferences and perceptions. 
 
“From this perspective, Europeanization is largely conceived as an 
emerging political opportunity structure which offers some actors 
additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining 
the ability of others to pursue their goals. Liberal 
intergovernmentalists suggest that European opportunities and 
constraints strengthen the action capacities of national executives 
enhancing their autonomy vis-a-vis other domestic actors 
(Moravcsik, 1994).”69    
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1.2.2 Sociological Institutionalism and the “Logic of Appropriateness” 
 
      The ‘logic of appropriateness’70 (LoA), on the other hand, challenges the 
underlying assumption of the ‘logic of consequentialism’ by arguing that, actors’ 
behaviors are not dependent upon their material interests; rather, their behaviors mainly 
reflect rules, norms, and identities of the group in which they are socialized.71 
‘Sociological institutionalism’ perceives institutions as independent variables on which 
actors’ interests, behaviors, and identities are dependent.72 In this sense, institutions 
reflect common understandings of what actors perceive as legitimate, efficient, or 
modern.73 Yet, there is more than one way in which agents may follow a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’.74 Actors may behave appropriately by learning a role irrespective of 
whether they like the role agree with it. Following a LoA ‘means simply that conscious 
instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing.’ This way of 
following LoA is called as Type I internalization. On the other hand, following LoA 
‘may go beyond role playing and imply that agents accept community or organizational 
norms as the right thing to do.’ Here, actors adopt interests and possibly the identity of 
the community of which they are a part. This is called  Type II internalization.75 Both 
types of LoA represents a shift away from the LoC, however, both capture different 
aspects of socialization.  
 
“Appropriateness need not attend consequences, but it involves 
cognitive and ethical dimensions, targets, and aspirations. As a 
cognitive matter , appropriate action is action that is essential to a 
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particular conception of self. As an ethical matter, appropriate action 
is action that is virtuous.”76  
 
      Therefore, according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ actors are mainly 
motivated by their ideational interests (legitimacy, reputation, self-affirmation) rather 
than material interests. By behaving in line with rules and norms that are shared 
collectively, actors manage to gain a certain degree of legitimacy in the eyes of others. 
Actors find themselves obliged to follow commonly shared rules and norms because 
failing to do so would result in legitimacy problem which, at the end of the day, would 
lead to certain ‘social costs’.77 As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) conclude, rules and 
norms shape actors strategies by defining standards of legitimacy.78 
 
     To put it in a nutshell, contrary to the ‘logic of consequentialism’, according to 
which actors’ behaviors mainly reflect preferences and expectations in terms of material 
utilities, for the ‘logic of appropriateness’, the fundamental factor is the concept of 
necessity driven by norms that define appropriate behavior.79 However, one could argue 
that although these two models seem in opposition to each other, they are not mutually 
exclusive. Political actors are guided by the elements of each model when they make a 
decision. They both evaluate their expected consequences and the rules shared 
commonly in their political institutions.80 The ‘logic of consequentialism’ assumes that 
actors shape their behaviors as a result of cost-benefit calculations in regard to their 
material gains. Yet, if actors’ interests and norms are in contradiction, actors tend to 
behave according to their ideational interests in order to persuade opponents and 
proponents that the action is appropriate as far as the collective normative 
understandings are taken into account. These competing logics would be beneficial in 
analyzing the reformation process that the Turkish military has gone through as a result 
of Europeanization process and the evolution of civil-military relations in Turkey in the 
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post-Helsinki era. ‘logic of consequentialism’ and ‘logic of appropriateness’ will be 
applied while analyzing how and why the Turkish military, a very strong political actor 
and veto player81 in the Turkish political system, has accepted its loss of power rather 
than preventing changing balance of power between the civilians and the military at the 
expense of latter as a consequence of Europeanization in Turkey. The LoC holds that, 
utility concern has motivated political reforms. In this respect, the AKP’s tenacious 
attitude towards the process of reform would be tied to the possible utilities that AKP 
would enjoy when the promoted reforms has implemented and the military, one of the 
most serious opponents of the government, has been pushed away from the political 
arena as a result of the political reform process (Chapter 4). On the other hand, LoA 
Type I holds that institutional actors would act in line with common rules and norms in 
order to gain legitimacy although acting in this way contradicts with their material 
interests. In this sense, it would be plausible to argue that, although the Turkish 
military’s power has been seriously challenged with the reform process, Turkish armed 
forces refrained from blocking this process in order not to lose its legitimacy in the eyes 
of Turkish people, majority of which support Turkey’s struggle for the EU membership 
(Chapter 4).  
  
 
1.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
      As a result of the last waves of expansion, the European Union has undergone a 
process of dramatic changes during the last decade. Most of the new member states that 
integrated into the Union are coming from fairly different backgrounds. Especially the 
eastern European countries, ruled according to the communist ideology for many years, 
were dissimilar to western European states in terms of political, economic and socio-
cultural dynamics. This gap between the existing states and newcomers has brought the 
issue of adaptation into the limelight. Thus, ‘Europeanization’, as adjustment of the 
domestic structures in line with European standards, has become more popular within 
the academic circles. 
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      In the post-Helsinki era Turkey has pushed hard to be eligible for full 
membership. As a result of various constitutional amendments Turkey has taken 
important steps to restructure its political and legal systems in line with the European 
Union institutions, rules and policies. In this sense, Turkish transformation can be 
analyzed under the larger framework of Europeanization. 
 
      Civil-military relations in Turkey and the privileged position that the Turkish 
military has occupied in the domestic political system are the two main issues that the 
European Union had wanted Turkey to modify as part of an Europeanization process. 
Amendments in regard to armed forces will be studied further in chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN TURKEY 
 
 
“The Atatürkist legacy is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, it 
forbids serving army officers to play any part in the legislature; on 
the other, it encourages them to think of themselves as the ultimate 
guardians of the Atatürk revolution.”82 
 
 
2.1. Status of the Turkish Military 
 
      Within the Turkish political system the military has enjoyed both ‘institutional 
autonomy’ and ‘political autonomy’. According to Pion-Berlin, ‘institutional autonomy’ 
is the “military’s professional independence and exclusivity.”83 It is a kind of defensive 
action so as to guard the military’s core professional functions against undesired 
interventions by external factors. This level of autonomy is a natural one because armed 
forces would like to make its own internal decisions about promotion, appointment, 
punishment, military education and modernization without the limits created by 
government and/or other factors.84 On the other hand, the ‘political autonomy’ refers to 
“the military’s aversion towards or even defiance of civilian control”.85 In the history of 
Turkish Republic military has gone above and beyond the constitutional authority of 
democratically elected governments, not only through direct interventions but also by 
the means of indirect influences on the government. In addition, it has not hesitated to 
benefit from legal/constitutional and structural reasons, and mechanisms to strengthen 
its predominant position in issuing demands, policy suggestions, and warnings on 
political matters.86 Thus, ‘political autonomy’ implies political prerogatives that the 
military enjoys in order to actualize its demands by putting the government under direct 
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or indirect influences. In modern democracies ‘political autonomy’ of the armed forces 
is limited and brought under direct control of the civilian governments by distinguishing 
military from political arena and limiting its maneuver area. Today, the prevailing civil-
military relations theory embraced by the Western agencies like the EU holds that in 
order to render militaries politically inactive civilian governments should be superior to 
the former and should control the armed forces closely. 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Role of the Turkish Military in Politics 
 
      The armed forces in Turkey have historically played an important role and 
occupied a privileged place with a strong degree of autonomy (Lerner & Robinson, 
1960; Cizre, 1997; Rouleau, 2000; Jenkins, 2001; Hale, 2003; Duman & Tsarouhas, 
2006). It is plausible to argue that the predominance of the military in Turkish public 
life is a legacy from the Ottoman Empire.87 According to Inalcık (1973), Ottoman 
Empire, the predecessor of the modern Turkish Republic, was a ‘warrior state’88 and 
this situation enabled military to acquire a decisive role in social, economic and political 
domains of the polity. As Lybyer defines, “the Ottoman government had been an army 
before it was anything else...in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the 
external purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men.”89 This strong 
tradition of military predominance in public life has survived in modern Turkey, and 
become one of the most serious problems in Turkey’s accession for the EU. In fact, one 
could argue that, the Ottoman tradition of close military-state ties was enhanced in the 
Republican era when the military came to be known not only as the defenders of the 
Republic, but also as the ‘guardian’ of Kemalist regime and six principles (nationalism, 
                                                 
87
 M. Heper, (2005a) “The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy” South European 
Society and Politics Vol. 10 No. 1 pp. 33-44 
88
 H. Inalcık, (1973) “The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600” London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson in O. Duman and D. Tsarouhas, (2006) ““Civilianization in Greece versus “Demilitarization” 
in Turkey” Armed Forces & Society Vol. 32 No. 3 pp. 405-423 
89
 A. H. Lybyer, (1913) “The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the 
Magnificent” Cambridge, Mass pp. 90-91 in D. Lerner and  R. D. Robinson, (1960) “Swords and 
Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as Modernising Force” World Politics Vol. 13 No. 1 pp. 19-44 
 38 
secularism, republicanism, populism, etatism, and reformism) of Kemalism.90 The 
military, which was the ‘object’ of Ottoman modernization in the late 19th century, 
turned out to be the ‘subject’ of modernization/Westernization with the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic.91 On the basis of Atatürk’s principles and his understanding of 
Westernization, the military begin to play a prominent role in Turkey’s political 
modernization. As the ‘guardian’ of Turkish Republic the major position that the 
military assigned itself was to preserve republic, secularism and national unity in the 
face of  Islamist, separatist, and sectarian challenges. However, the position that the 
military placed itself to protect democracy and other principles of Kemalism was in 
contradiction with democracy as such. Because, as Cizre points out, the inability of the 
civilian politicians to control the military created two parallel state structures, one 
civilian and the other military, which in turn undermined the authority and the 
democratic accountability of elected civilian governments.92  
 
“As a result of its ‘rationalist’ understanding of democracy93, 
according to which the military has continuously tried to ensure that 
the regime functions according to the Kemalist principles and to the 
best interest of the society, there have been four military 
interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997). Although these 
interventions are seen as examples of guardian regimes, where the 
military ‘sorts out the mess’ in a limited time and returns power to 
civilians to avoid future ‘malpractices and deficiencies,’ the 
military’s political activism hinders the consolidation of 
democracy.”94 
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      In this chapter, background information about the civil military relations in 
Turkey will be given by putting light on cornerstone developments in Turkish history.       
 
 
2.2. The Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey 
 
      Although it is ironic, one could argue that the role of the military in the Turkish 
politics was enhanced rather than diminished when Turks established parliamentary 
democracy after the collapse of Ottoman Empire.95 Although the process of 
civilianization, initiated by Atatürk, flourished with the introduction of multi-party 
system after 1945, ineffectiveness of the government to provide prosperity, and 
political stability resulted in return of the military into the political arena in the 1950s. 
Subsequently, by achieving popular support, the Turkish military gradually attained “an 
interventionist role in the political process as the guarantor of last resort of stability and 
public order.”96 Due to its series of direct and indirect interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, 
1997) the Turkish military has been perceived as one of the ‘political armies’ of the 
world.97 On several occasions in the Turkish history, due to political infighting civil 
governments have failed to provide peace and stability within the country which 
created an opportunity for the military to play a prominent role in the political arena by 
removing civil governments and superseding them. 
 
 
2.2.1. The Military Takeover of 27 May 1960 and the Establishment of National 
Security Council 
 
      Although the Turkish Republic was established under the leadership of a 
military cadre, once a new regime was installed Atatürk decided to assign civilians, not 
the soldiers, as the rulers of the new regime. Atatürk believed that active participation 
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of military members in politics would result in legitimacy problems and corruption.98 
Hence, after the proclamation of the republic in 1923, he made it compulsory for 
officers to resign from military services if they wanted to retain a seat in the 
parliamentary.99 Atatürk wanted all of his chief military commanders to give up their 
assembly positions. When he spoke to parliament, he underlined that, “I have come to 
the conclusion that, for the maintenance of army discipline in required measure for the 
exercise of command, it is incompatible that commanders should at the same time be 
deputies.”100 One of the most significant examples of the ‘demilitarization’ of the 
administration was the Article 40 of the 1924 Constitution which gave charge of the 
army to the Grand National Assembly and, as its representative, to the president.101 
Furthermore, the civilian control over the military consolidated when the chief of the 
general staff became answerable to the cabinet and prime minister rather than the 
president of the republic.102 Later, a Supreme Council of National Defense, composed 
of several cabinet ministers, was created in order to balance the power and authority of 
the general staff.103 In Inonu’s time civilian control over the military was further 
enhanced when a law which subordinated the chief of the general staff to the ministry 
of defense was promulgated on May 30, 1949.104 This step was another approach to 
establish a western type civil-military relations under which military is controlled and 
regulated by civilian authorities. Therefore, one would argue that, Atatürk deliberately 
attempted to ‘civilianize’ the administration by removing military out of political life 
and by permitting the military institutions to decline in relation to civilian power and 
prestige. However, these endeavors to promote civilian supremacy in public life was 
reversed suddenly when the military carried out a coup d’etat against the Menderes 
government in 1960 and took over the administration of the country.  
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      As it was mentioned above, from the foundation of the Republic in 1923 until 
the 1950s when the first fully free multi-party elections were held, Turkey was ruled by 
former soldiers. However, ‘civilianization’ process of politics, led by Atatürk, had 
rendered armed forces politically quiescent and impoverished.105 After the 
establishment of the republic Turkish economy was in a bad condition and that affected 
modernization of the military adversely. In the 1940s, the level of technical equipment 
of the army was quite inadequate.106 Raising unease among the soldiers intensified with 
the manner that the military was exposed to by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. 
Menderes disrupted the ‘institutional autonomy’ of the armed forces by interfering in 
appointments and promotions regarding the armed forces.107 Moreover, as Ahmad 
points out, Menderes disregarded unfavorable living standards of the soldiers and did 
not take their demands for higher salaries into consideration.108 Besides these material 
conditions, Turkish military had the image that Adnan Menderes was not fully 
committed to secularism and other principles of Kemalism. Military believed that the 
Democrat Party (DP) used Islam as a populist policy of pleasing the population. 
Therefore, as the subject of Westernization/modernization109 and guardian of Kemalist 
principles, a group of young officers decided to intervene in politics by overthrowing 
the government and taking over the administration of country on May 27, 1960.   
 
      After the coup former Prime Minister Menderes and two of his ministers were 
judged by a military court and found guilty of attempting to alter the constitution by 
force. These three politicians were hanged after the trial. 
 
      Military rule after the coup was formalized with the establishment of a military 
oriented legislative organ: the National Unity Committee (NUC). NUC was a pure 
military body headed by former chief of the general staff, Cemal Gürsel. When Gürsel 
was appointed as head of state, prime minister and minister of defense; he, in theory, 
enjoyed more absolute power than even Atatürk had ever had.110 Throughout this 
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period military enjoyed full autonomy from civilian government by replacing civilian 
institutions with military organs composed of officers and chosen technocrats. 
Furthermore, one would argue that, for a kind of transformation desired by soldiers, a 
simple government change would not be enough. Hence, the military designated five 
university professors as the writers of a new constitution. Therefore, on June 12, 1961 
the NUC, assisted by a team of professors, promulgated a provisional constitution 
which was designed to construct a legal basis both for the direct and indirect military 
interventions into politics and for the existence of military rule under the umbrella of 
NUC. According to this constitution, chief of the general staff began to be defined as 
the commander of armed forces and therefore was made responsible to the prime 
minister.111 This development has changed power relations between the military and the 
citizenry in favor of the former. As it was mentioned above, chief of the general staff 
had been made subordinate to the ministry of defense after the introduction of a multi-
party democracy in 1946. However, one would argue that, the 1961 constitution 
enabled armed forces to regain its upper hand by being responsible to the prime 
minister rather than the ministry of defense.  
 
      Military’s power was further reinforced with the changes in 1970. In that year, 
two laws dealing with the position of chief of the general staff were passed. According 
to these laws, chief of the general staff was provided with the competence to 
“determine the priorities and principles and main programs concerning personnel, 
intelligence, mobilization, education and logistics”112 In addition to this, it was also 
stated that “in determination of the military aspects and implementation of international 
agreements, chief of the general staff would be consulted. It may participate in those 
meetings if it is deemed necessary.”113  
 
      Today, according to the 1982 Constitution, chief of the general staff is still 
responsible to the prime minister rather than the ministry of national defense.114 The 
main reason behind the military’s insistence about the position of the chief of staff is to 
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prevent the politicization of the military.115 Military’s argument is that, if chief of the 
general staff is subordinate to the ministry of national defense, it would easily be 
replaced on the basis of political preferences which would give any government an 
opportunity to shape the Turkish armed forces in respect to their own understanding.116 
Status of the chief of the general staff under the prime minister has been target of the 
EU’s criticisms on various occasions. 
 
“Civilian control over the military needs to be improved. Contrary to 
EU, NATO and OSCE standards, instead of being answerable to the 
Defense Minister, the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to 
the Prime Minister. It is also noted that the Council of Higher 
Education which controls the activities of the institutions of higher 
education, as well as the Higher Education Supervisory Board, 
include one member selected by the Chief of General Staff.”117  
 
      Before turning back to the civilian rule military wanted to pass various laws in 
order to enhance its presence and to consolidate its position as the guardian of the 
country and the regime. Besides the law in regard to the status of the chief of the 
general staff, Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law was promulgated in 1961. 
This law contained the most detailed statement of the legal role and obligations of the 
military.118 Internal Service Law can be interpreted as the construction of the legal 
ground for the ‘guardianship’ role of the military119 “which specifically charges the 
military with responsibility for protecting the nature of the Turkish regime, including 
Kemalist principles of territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism.”120 Article 35 
of the Internal Service Law states that, “Duty of the armed forces is to safeguard and 
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defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey as defined by the 
constitution.”121 
 
      Furthermore, implications about the possibility of future interventions and its 
self assigned competence to act autonomously without necessarily receiving 
authorization from civil authorities can be understood with the Article 85 of the same 
act: “Turkish armed forces shall defend the country against internal as well as external 
threats, if necessary by force.”122 
 
 
2.2.1.1. National Security Council    
 
      The National Security Council (NSC), established in 1961, was termed out to be 
an important institution which reinforces the role of military in politics. Existence of 
such an institution used by the military as the main tool for shaping domestic and 
foreign policies has made the NSC center of criticisms directed by the EU. Initially, 
NSC was established as a constitutional tool through which the military expresses its 
views. The main motive behind the establishment of such an institutional organ was the 
inability of the military to make their views known by the politicians and the military’s 
sense of alienation from the political decision making process.123 Originally, the 
number of civilians within the NSC was higher than the number military commanders. 
The Council was chaired by the president of the republic, and it was composed of the 
prime minister, the chief of staff, the minister of defense, internal and foreign affairs, 
the commanders of the army, navy and air force, and the general commander of the 
gendarmerie. Other ministers and officials might be invited according to the agenda of 
the Council. The NSC was established under the Article 111 of the 1961 constitution: 
 
“The National Security Council shall consist of the ministers as 
provided by law, the Chief of General Staff, and representatives of the 
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armed forces. The President of the Republic shall preside over the 
National Security Council, and in his absence this function shall be 
discharged by the Prime Minister. The National Security Council shall 
communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the 
Council of Ministers with the purpose of assisting the making of 
decisions related to national security and coordination.”124 (emphasis 
added) 
 
      Therefore, according to the 1961 constitution the raison d’etre of the NSC was 
to develop a channel for the military to share its views and opinions with the Council of 
Ministers. Hence, the role of the Council was to assist the government in the formation 
of a national security policy. Here, the emphasis should be placed on the word ‘assist’ 
which implies that the council was initially designed as a consultative body which 
suggests the necessary basic guidelines in regard to the coordination and the taking of 
decisions related to the national security.125 However, from an advisory body, 
subsequently, the NSC had transformed into an executive decision making body. For 
military, the NSC was a legal platform through which it articulated its views on all 
matters of security. Yet, unlike initial motives, NSC started to enjoy greater power after 
each military intervention. For example, number of civilians was supposed to be higher 
than the military members according to the initial organization. But the number of 
military members increased in course of time, this development represented increasing 
power of the military against civilians within the Council. The 1982 constitution 
provided the NSC with the authority to deploy five military and civilian members; 
according to the 1961 constitution numbers had been four and seven-eight respectively. 
Most importantly, Article 118 of the 1982 constitution obliged the council of ministers 
to ‘give priority consideration’ to the decisions of the NSC.126 Original text of the 
Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution states that: 
 
“The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of 
Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary 
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coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment and 
implementation of the National Security policy of the State. The 
Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the 
decisions of the Council concerning the measures that it deems 
necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of 
the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace 
and security of society.”127 
 
      In this manner, with the 1982 constitution the government was forced to give 
‘priority’ to the decisions and recommendations of the Council dominated by the 
military. This development transformed the NSC into a kind of ‘shadow government’128 
which ruled the country behind the curtains. If the evolution of the NSC is traced, in the 
wake of the 1960 military coup the NSC was to offer information to the council of 
ministers in order to assist the government in decision making process; in the aftermath 
of the 1971 intervention it began to recommend measures; and following the 1980 coup 
the government was compelled to give top priority to the recommendations made by the 
NSC.129 This evolution depicts the transformation of the NSC from an advisory body to 
a quasi executive body. 
 
      One would argue that, establishment of the NSC, which opened a new link for 
military to have a voice in the political system, combined with the promulgation of the 
Internal Service Law enabled the military to justify its interventions on the ground that 
it was the military’s legal obligation to take action in case of an imminent threat coming 
from an internal or external factor. Indeed, as Cizre points out, in all interventions 
juntas have argued that they were fulfilling a legal obligation rather than exceeding 
their legal competence.130 
 
      Thus, through legal arrangements NSC has rendered itself as a legal entity 
which had right to shape domestic policies related with issues linked to national 
security. However, which made this prerogative more meaningful was the fact that the 
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concept of ‘national security’ was defined by the National Security Council Law of 
1983. In other words, the military had drawn the framework of the ‘national security’ 
concept, and acted on the basis the framework prepared by itself. Jenkins argues that, 
the National Security Council Law of 1983 embedded such a broad understanding of 
‘national security’ concept that it covered every part and parcel of the public life.131 
Article 2a of the Law states that, “National security means the defense and protection of 
the state against every kind of external and internal threat to the constitutional order; 
national existence, unity, and to all its interests and contractual rights in the 
international arena including in the political, social, cultural, and economic spheres.”132 
Consequently, ranging from social to economic sphere such kind of a broad definition 
enabled military to legitimize its future interventions as a reaction to any development 
which contradicts with the military’s security conception. 
 
 
2.2.2. (Re)intervention by the Military: 12 March 1971 
   
      1960s signified a process of change for Turkey. Rapid industrialization led to 
urbanization through which many rural populations moved from their villages to newly 
developing cities. This rapid increase in city populations made rising unemployment 
rates inescapable. Besides unemployment, student population which had became more 
sensitive to politics turned out to be active participants in demonstrations and labor 
union strikes against government. In the mean time, extreme leftists and extreme 
rightists benefited from the polarization of the society and instigated the emerging 
anarchy within the society. Thereafter, the country was dragged into a turmoil. 
 
      Although the military was firmly committed to parliamentary democracy 
throughout the 1960s, relations between the government and military became tense in 
the second half of the decade when growing political violence, student demonstrations, 
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labor union strikes and violent manifestations anti-Americanism had deepened the 
instability and resulted in a tumultuous atmosphere in the public.133 
 
      In the very beginning of the 1970s it was realized that the Demirel government 
was nearly paralyzed since it was incapable of taking actions so as to stop the violence 
on the campuses and streets. Similarly, the parliament was deactivated in the sense that 
it was not possible to pass any serious legislation on social or financial issues in the 
assembly.134 Therefore, as Jenkins concludes, “after a decade of fractious, mostly short-
lived partisan governments and amid mounting political violence, initially by leftist 
groups but which then triggered a rightist backlash, the military intervened again in 
early 1971.”135 Eventually, Turkish armed forces declared a memorandum signed by 
the chief of the general staff and consigned to the president, prime minister and the 
chairman of the parliament. Demirel resigned immediately after the memorandum was 
transmitted on the radio.  
 
      In the memorandum it was declared that “with the continuing attitude, ideas and 
actions the parliament and the government have taken our country into anarchy, fight of 
brothers and sisters, and social and economic unrest. This not only has resulted in loss 
of hope within the public to reach contemporary civilization levels as assigned by 
Atatürk, but also has rendered the parliament incapable of realizing the reforms 
projected by the constitution. This situation has put the future of the Turkish Republic 
in a serious threat.”136  
 
      As clearly understood from the memorandum, armed forces was blaming both 
the government and the parliament because of the continuous anarchy and insufficient 
social and economic situations. However, at the first stage, the military preferred to call 
for the formation of a new government to restore order and implement reforms in a 
Kemalist spirit. Yet, as declared in the ultimatum, armed forces would not hesitate to 
                                                 
133
 For a detailed analysis of the Turkey’s socio-political condition in the 1960s and 1970s see: E. Kongar, 
(2008) “21. Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000’li Yıllarda Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı” Remzi Kitabevi  
134
 E. Zurcher, (1998) 
135
 G. Jenkins, (2001) p. 37 
136
 Author’s translation from Beyaz Kitap, (1973) “Türkiye Gerçekleri ve Terorizm” pp. 52-53 in             
E. Kongar, (2008) p. 170 
 49 
take the administration over by a coup d’etat provided that order was not restored and 
the predicted reforms were not implemented by the new government. Hence, for the 
next two years Turkey was ruled by governments dominated by technocrats who were 
chosen according to their degree of commitment to the military. After this two years 
period under the watchful eye of the military, full civilian administration was finally 
restored by the general election of October 1973. Until civilian rule was reestablished, 
non-partisan cabinets under the strong influence of the military imposed laws requested 
by the armed forces, suppressed the press, outlawed strikes, arrested hundreds of leftist 
activists, and dissolved the leftist Turkish Workers Party.137 Furthermore, State Security 
Courts, abolished in 2004 as part of a ‘Europanization process in Turkish political 
system, were introduced under the military rule after the coup.138  
 
      Unlike what had been envisaged by the military, the 1971 intervention failed to 
formulate and construct either good governance or political stability. Throughout the 
1970s governments were unsuccessful in curbing political polarization and violence. In 
addition to this, economic developments like growing unemployment, oil crises, rising 
inflation and worsening distribution of income rendered governments defective in 
attaining political and economic stability. Instability in the form of clashes between 
ultra-nationalist militants and radical leftists combined with union strikes and student 
demonstrations against domestic economic crisis triggered by rise in global oil prices 
did not allow politically weak coalition governments to restore order and promote 
necessary reforms as requested by the military. Therefore, by using its legal rights 
provided by the Internal Service Act, the military seized power on September 12, 1980 
by dissolving parliament, declaring a state of emergency and suspending all political 
parties. 
 
      Cyprus issue, one of the most serious issues that needs to be solved for Turkey 
to make progress in negotiations with the European Union, had also effect in the 
military intervention in 1980. Turkish government under the rule of Bülent Ecevit 
wanted to take action as a reaction to military coup that had been held by the Greek 
Junta against Makarios (President of the Republic of Cyprus). When Great Britain and 
Greece (two other guarantor states of Cyprus) refused to act with Turkey, Ecevit 
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ordered an independent military intervention in Cyprus. With the operation, nearly 40% 
of the island was brought under Turkish control. Although this operation has had 
adverse affects in Turkey’s relations with the western countries (some of these 
problems still put Turkey in difficult situation in regard to EU membership), in the eyes 
of the vast majority of Turkish population Turkish military had successfully protected 
the rights of Turkish minority in Cyprus.139 Success of the Turkish armed forces in 
Cyprus strengthened the level of trust that the people had felt toward the military and 
made it easier for the military to legitimize its next intervention on September 12, 
1980.140 Thus, as Cizre concludes, the deep void in political authority during the 
political crisis before 1980 supported with the rising prestige of the military after the 
1974 Cyprus intervention had resulted in expansion of the political autonomy of the 
military which in turn led to 1980 coup.141 
 
 
2.3.3 A Breaking Point: 12 September 1980 
 
      The military regime began on September 12, 1980, but contrary to what Kenan 
Evren, the chief of staff, had promised, the five-man military rule remained in power 
until December 6, 1983. Reasons and aims of the intervention were declared by a 
nationwide radio and television broadcasting. According to this proclamation, the 
existence and the independence of the Turkish Republic had been under attack posed by 
internal and external threats. And the primary bodies of the state had been unable to act 
against these threats. Instead of Kemalism, other reactionary and deviant ideologies had 
been systematically promoted and enforced in the universities, labor unions and 
political parties. In other words, military had the image that Turkish state had been 
weakened and the threat of disunity and civil-war were at the doorstep. Therefore, 
under these conditions by exploiting legal rights assigned to it by the internal service 
act, Turkish armed forces seized power to protect the integrity, to provide national 
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unity, to prevent a possible civil war and to restore the authority of the state by 
eliminating factors that prevented the political system functioning.142 
 
      In comparison to preceding interventions, the 1980 coup was more 
comprehensive and its objective was to restructure not only the political system but also 
Turkish public life.143 Throughout the next three years all power was concentrated in 
the hands of NSC headed by the chief of staff, Kenan Evren, who was also head of the 
state since September 14, 1980. Under the military rule a total of 669 new laws were 
promulgated.144 All the former parliamentarians were sent home, political leaders were 
banned from politics and the political parties were abolished. Moreover, all mayors and 
municipal councils were dismissed.145 A week after the coup, the NSC composed of 
military members merely appointed a cabinet which consisted of bureaucrats and 
retired officers; in other words, there were no active politicians among its members.146 
The only function that the cabinet fulfilled was to advise the NSC and execute its 
decisions. Cabinet was not the only instrument through which the NSC acted. The NSC 
managed to penetrate into all parts and parcels of the local administrations through 
regional and local commanders provided with excessive authority. Aim of the NSC was 
to restore the authority of state by eliminating former politicians, who had been accused 
of taking the country into anarchy, and by forcing people to obey the new rules created 
by the NSC. To achieve this, from the military’s perspective, any political ideology 
other than Kemalism needed to be abolished.147 Consequently, the NSC banished public 
debates about politics and the former politicians were forbidden from making 
comments about the past, present, and future.148 Last but not least, under the rule of 
NSC many professors, university students, journalists, trade unionists were hunted 
down and arrested.  
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      Different than previous interventions, after the 1980 coup the military was not 
content with reshaping the political system, in order to reach people and dictate its 
ideology military decided to take the control of education system and media as well. 
With the establishment of Council of Higher Education (YÖK) all universities and their 
activities were put under strict control. Rectors and deans began to be appointed by the 
Council.149 The main aim in making universities subordinate to YÖK was to bring 
order to the universities and to end political polarization in the campuses which had 
been the epicenter of the ideological clashes and street violence. Similar to YÖK, 
military launched a new council, Radio and Television High Council (RTÜK), so as to 
manipulate the mass media as an instrument to settle the values, norms and principles 
of the coup in the minds of people permanently.  
 
      Thus, after the military intervention in 1980, autonomy of the military and its 
influence in the political arena shifted in comparison to the preceding interventions.150 
The pattern of politics created by the coup was more authoritarian than ever before. As 
Cizre concludes, “contrary to the previous constitution of 1961, also the product of a 
coup, the 1982 constitution was designed by the military in line with the conservative 
logic of transition and restructured the Turkish polity by narrowing the bases of 
political participation and strengthening state institutions. It provided an ideal context 
for the expansion of military power vis-à-vis the three branches of government through 
legal institutional channels.”151 Some military members argue that the coup in 1980 
saved Turkey from a civil war which could have had devastating effects for Turkey’s 
political democracy. However, one could argue that, while restoring ‘atmosphere of 
peace and security’, as described by the military, power of the armed forces and its 
institutional political role as the guardian of the state bolstered with the coup.152 
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 Main objective of the military in the post-intervention period was to reconstruct 
a political system within which the NSC was the dominant authority, while other 
political actors were brought under severe restrictions. The 1982 Constitution was 
designed in order to create such kind of a political life. The new constitution, which had 
various commonalities with de Gaulle’s constitution153, concentrated power in the 
hands of the executive while increasing the powers of the president and the National 
Security Council. On the other hand, the freedom of press, the freedom of trade unions, 
and the rights and liberties of the individuals were limited. As it will be mentioned in 
detail in the 3rd chapter, although the fundamental rights and liberties (freedom of 
speech, freedom of association, etc.) were included in the constitution, there were also 
other provisions embedded in the constitution which stipulated that these fundamental 
rights and freedoms could be annulled, suspended or limited on the grounds of a whole 
series of considerations, including the public order and national security.154 After the 
adoption of constitution and Evren’s installation as president, the generals believed that 
the infrastructure for the new political system was built. Subsequently, the next stage of 
political reconstruction program began with the promulgation of a new Law on Political 
Parties in April, 1983. The new law stipulated that political parties could be established 
with the participation of at least 30 founding members. However, their founders needed 
the approval of the NSC, and the NSC had the right to veto any founding member 
without showing legal ground for its decision.155 In a few weeks time seventeen 
political parties were introduced. Yet, fourteen political parties were banned. Erdal 
İnönü’s ‘Social Democrat Party’ (SODEP) and Süleyman Demirel’s ‘Great Turkey 
Party’ (BTP) were included in those that were banned from elections. According to 
generals, SODEP was the successor of the ‘Republican People’s Party’, while the BTP 
was following the same road with Demirel’s Jutice Party. Since generals were 
attempting to create a new political life, they wanted to leave these parties that 
symbolized the pre-1980 period out of the political arena.156  
 
  Among the three political parties; namely, the Party of Nationalist Democracy, 
the Populist Party, and the Motherland Party (ANAP), ANAP, under the leadership of 
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Turgut Özal, scored an overwhelming victory in the elections by receiving over 45 per 
cent of the vote. In the elections military supported the Party of Nationalist Democracy 
which came the third with nearly 23 per cent of the vote. This result was interpreted as 
proof that public opinion wanted the military to stay out of politics. Thus, the civilian 
rule under the shadow of the military was restored with the 1983 elections. Turgut Özal 
embraced liberal ideas both in political and economic realms. He continued the process 
of democratization and he was determined to re-establish the primacy of civilian 
politics over the military.157 Before the municipal elections of March 1984, the ANAP 
majority in the assembly voted to allow some of the parties which had been banned 
from the general elections held a year before. Although this was a strategic move of 
Özal in order to fragment the opposition by including new parties into elections, it was 
also regarded as an important step in lifting political restrictions enforced by the 
military. Özal wanted to undermine the dominance of the military over the political 
domain. Parallel to his desire, Özal overturned the military hierarchy by appointing 
General Torumtay, and not the senior general Öztorun, as the new chief of staff. 
Furthermore, in 1987, the government made a change in the constitution and allowed 
old politicians to take part in politics once more. As Zürcher points, liberalization of the 
political environment in the second half of the 1980s gave birth to a further broadening 
of the political spectrum with the emergence of radical parties and recovery of the 
traditional left. However, the scope of democratization was determined by the 
permission of the military. In November, 1987 leaders of the United Communist Party 
of Turkey, who had been in exile since the 1980 coup, returned to Turkey and on their 
arrival at the airport, they were immediately arrested by the order of the army.158  
 
 After the interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980 the military ruled the country 
either behind the scenes or directly. Each intervention disturbed the power structures 
within which military and civil governments were in competition for preserving their 
political powers. In line with the ‘logic of consequentialism’ approach presented above, 
after each intervention the military undertook institutional changes in order to create a 
new political system which provided the military more power and authority while 
reducing the power of other actors, like civilians, vis-à-vis the armed forces. 
Constitutional and legal changes created the legal ground for the dominance of the 
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military in the political life. Thus, institutional changes in favor of the military after 
interventions gave an opportunity to preserve its privileged position and consolidated 
its supremacy in the civil-military relations. However, in the 1990s and later, Turkey 
began to take steps in the areas of consolidation of democracy, human rights, rule of 
law and fundamental freedoms in order to be compatible with the demands put forward 
by the EU to be a full member. These reforms have challenged the legal base of the 
military’s actions which most of the time violated human rights, rule of law and 
fundamental freedoms principles. When institutional changes weakened the role and 
authority of the military as a political actor, it began to become more difficult for the 
armed forces to legitimize its interventions in politics. Hence, since the 1980 coup 
Turkey  has not experienced a  full fledged coup similar to previous ones. Turkey’s 
adaptation process to EU standards has had impacts over the power and authority of the 
Turkish armed forces.               
 
 
2.2.4. Turkish Military Against Islamist and Separatist Movements: 1990s 
 
      During the 1990s Turkey began to show an enhanced determination to become 
part of the EU. Military, as the inheritor of the Kemalist ideology, supported Turkey’s 
Westernization project discerning that it was compatible with Atatürk’s ideas. 
However, contrary to its support for EU membership, Turkish armed forces appeared in 
the political arena, once again, and intervened in politics by forcing Islamist-led 
government to resign in 1997. In the mid-1990s influence of the Islam and Kurdish 
separatism grew significantly. Impact of Islamist movements in politics through the 
activities of Welfare Party (RP) and PKK’s coming into prominence as a separatist 
movement resulted in progressive increase of the military influence. For military the 
threat was so close that the national military defense concept embodied in the National 
Security Policy Document (NSPD)159 was redefined and the priority was “given to 
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combating internal threats from Islamic activism and Kurdish separatism, rather than 
safeguarding the state against interstate wars and external threats.”160 
 
      Presence of the NSC in the political arena was first observed with the decisions 
made on February 28, 1997 to inhibit the increasing reactionary activities of political 
Islam which, according to the military, began to pose a serious threat against the main 
principles of the Kemalist ideology like secularism. Military’s unease was exacerbated 
with the speeches given by leaders and deputies of the Welfare Party. One of the most 
alarming statements was Necmettin Erbakan’s (leader of the RP) question to the 
representatives of the RP to consider whether the change in public life and social order 
that the party sought would be “peaceful or violent”, and would be achieved 
“harmoniously or by bloodshed.”161 As an answer to his leader, Ibrahim Halil Çelik, a 
former RP deputy, expressed his anger against those who wanted to abolish the Prayer 
Leader and Preacher Schools by saying that: 
 
“I too would like blood to flow. That is how democracy will be 
consolidated in Turkey...in its fight against PKK the army has not 
been able to deal with 3.500 separatists. How will it deal with six 
million Islamists? If the army piss into the wind, it will get its face 
wet...I will fight to the end to establish Sharia.”162   
 
      Another statement which appealed criticisms by the military came from the 
mayor of Kayseri, Şükrü Karatepe: 
 
“Do not think that I am a supporter of Kemalism. I have to attend 
ceremonies on the Memorial Day of Atatürk in spite of myself...This 
system must change. We have waited, we will wait a little 
                                                                                                                                               
civilians who manage to read the document are the civilian members of the NSC. Given the fact that it is 
a secret document and it is not prepared by the civilian government, some authors and academicians 
prefer to refer it as ‘secret constitution’ or ‘real constitution.’ See: Radikal Gazatesi, December 18, 2006 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=207664 
160
 A. Güney and P. Karatekelioğlu, (2005)  pp. 446 
161
 Milliyet, January 17, 1998 “Partiyi Kapatmaya Götüren Sözler” 
162
 ibid. 
 57 
longer...Let resentment, rancor, and hatred in the hearts of Muslims 
stay alive.”163  
 
      As a reaction to these developments, the military decided to prepare a 18 point 
list of ultimatum164 to the coalition government under the leadership of Erbakan. The 
decisions of February 28, 1997 has been perceived as an ‘indirect intervention’ in 
Turkish politics and regarded as a ‘post-modern coup.’165 Erbakan, who would not 
implement the decisions in order not to disrupt his supporters, had no choice other than 
leaving the office. This post-modern coup reminded the civilians of the fact that the 
military was capable of using both formal and informal mechanisms to give shape to 
the activities of governments and to ensure that they remain within the parameters 
defined by the military’s perception of the threat environment.166 
 
 
2.2.5. A new Mechanism to Influence the Civilian Government: e-Memorandum 
 
      Since the 1960s the military in Turkey has staged four coups. After the coups in 
1960 and 1980 military ruled the country directly (during 1960-62, and 1980-83), while 
it preferred to rule the country indirectly by handing the administration to a cabinet 
after 1971 coup (during 1971-1973). In 1997 military forced the Islamist-led 
government to resign and allowed another civilian government to take power. Actually, 
military’s interventions into politics are not limited with the four coups presented 
above. Military usually opts for making recommendations and convincing civilian 
governments in order to implement policies in line with its main concerns. When a 
civilian government is efficient in maintaining stability and does not infringe the limits 
set by the military on the basis of national security conception, the military’s influence 
on the government diminishes. However, if the political instability bolsters and the 
civilian government acts reluctant in implementing policies wanted by the military, it 
exercises more authority over the government through various ways which, in some 
cases, have ended up with a coup at the end of the day. The methods used by the 
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military to influence civilian governments vary according to the “policy area, the nature 
of the perceived security threat, its importance or urgency and response of the civilian 
authorities.”167 In areas where the military plays a key role in the formulation of policy, 
military tends to use official instruments like the NSC and informal channels such as 
politicians and bureaucrats. In some cases related with ideological issues, if the 
government fails to act in line with military’s requests, military would attempt to direct 
public opinion against the government by public speeches, interviews and briefings to 
selected journalists.168 
 
      The main official platform for the military to exercise influence over the 
government is NSC. During the NSC meetings members of the Council express their 
opinions about the issues in the agenda presented by the president. On the basis of 
opinions coming from the Council members, the president formulates a conclusion on 
which all of them would agree. Thus, the NSC recommendations are based on 
consensus; no voting takes place in the decision making process. Given the military’s 
dominance in the Council, one would argue that, most of the civilian members would 
not dare standing against opinions embraced by the military members.169 Neither in the 
Council meetings, nor when the NSC recommendations are brought in front of the 
government, civilian governments have been powerful enough to issue a direct 
challenge to the military.170 If the military is not satisfied with the efficiency of the 
policies implemented by the government it would also increase the intensity of the 
pressure on the government by deploying some informal mechanisms. 
 
      In order to support institutional mechanisms, the military has also used informal 
mechanisms to shape the public opinion and influence government indirectly. These 
informal mechanisms range from public pronouncements and briefings to journalists to 
informal contacts with bureaucrats and politicians.171 The public pronouncements are 
usually given by the TGS members at official occasions like commemorations, 
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anniversaries or graduation ceremonies. In these cases, the military uses mass media 
and speaks to both government and public in order to express its concerns about 
domestic issues in general. Statements by the military are perceived as warnings to the 
civilian government and as pressure to the public to take necessary action against the 
government. Occasionally, the military would use some trusted journalists to release its 
warnings in detail. In some cases, the military has attempted to influence bureaucrats 
directly. For example, during the 1997 campaign against the RP, military not only used 
public pronouncements and briefings to press, but also it expressed its discontent with 
the RP through informal visits or telephone calls to bureaucrats. As Jenkins illustrates, 
“the military also applied indirect pressure to secularists in the coalition government, 
particularly members of the junior partner Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP), who received 
visits or telephone calls, mostly from civilian Kemalist acquaintances, asking them to 
consider their positions. The result was a stream of resignations from the TPP, which 
eroded the coalition’s majority and forced the resignation of Islamist Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan on 18 June 1997.”172  
 
      Apart from these formal and informal mechanisms to influence the government, 
on April 27, 2007 military introduced a new way of expressing its opinions about 
developments in the Turkish political system. Tension between the civilian government 
and the military increased during the period of presidential elections in 2007. Military 
tried to change the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’s (AKP) decision to present the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, as its presidential candidate. Military’s actions before 
and during the presidential election process recalled political interventions in 1960, 
1971, 1980 and 1997.173 Actually, it was first rumored that some retired military 
members had urged the Chief of the General Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, to put a pressure 
over the government in order to prevent a situation whereby an anti-secular candidate 
becomes president.174 Subsequently, attitude of the military towards the AKP 
government became more adamant especially in the areas of Cyprus and PKK issues. 
During his news conference on April 12, 2007 Yaşar Büyükanıt pointed that the 
presidential elections are directly related with the Turkish Armed Forces because the 
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president would be the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces as well. He 
also stated that, “as a citizen and as a member of the armed forces I hope someone who 
is loyal to the main principles of the republic and committed to secular, unitary 
structure of the state –not just in words, but in essence- would be the president.”175 A 
day later, on April 13, a weekly magazine, Nokta, which had published diaries of a 
retired admiral revealing how senior officers wanted to seize power almost from the 
time the AKP came to office, was raided by police and closed down.176 The raid was 
interpreted as a message to all media to hold back articles critical of the military.177  
 
      Military also played a leading role in organizing people to stage a series of 
protests against the AKP government. In the main cities of Turkey such as Istanbul, 
Ankara, Izmir millions of people who are committed to Kemalist principles came 
together and cried their desire to have a secular president. Şener Eruygur, a retired 
commander of gendarmerie, was one of the main organizers of the series of protests. 
Despite the protests and military’s other formal and informal mechanisms to influence 
the government, AKP did not withdraw Abdullah Gül as its presidential candidate. 
When the number of AKP deputies was taken into account, it became certain that Gül 
would be elected president in the parliament. As a reaction, Turkish General Staff 
published a memorandum warning of the danger to secularism on its web-site on April 
27, 2007. This was the first time the military had used the Internet to influence the 
government and to give warning to it by pointing that the Turkish Armed Forces was 
watching the process and could take action as the defender of secularism: 
 
       “It is being observed that certain circles that are waging a 
relentless struggle to erode the founding principles of the Turkish 
Republic starting with secularism have recently increased their 
efforts. These activities, which are constantly being brought to the 
attention of the pertinent authorities in an appropriate manner, 
encompass a broad spectrum of activities ranging from their wish to 
question and redefine the founding principles to the creation of 
alternative celebrations to our national holidays, which are the 
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symbol of our state's independence and the unity and integrity of our 
nation...This reactionary mindset, which is opposed to our Republic 
and has no other aim than to undermine the founding principles of 
our state, has been encouraged by certain developments and rhetoric 
in recent days and is broadening the scope of its activities...It is a 
clear fact that this behavior and these actions contradict entirely the 
principle of "being loyal to the Republic regime in spirit and not in 
word and of acting in such a way as to show this" as stated by the 
Chief of Staff in a news conference on 12 April 2007, and that they 
violate the founding qualities and provisions of the Constitution. The 
question that has come to the fore in the recent run up to the 
presidential elections is focused on the secularism debate. This 
situation is being watched in trepidation by the Turkish Armed 
Forces. It must not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces do 
take sides in this debate and are the sure and certain defenders of 
secularism. Moreover, the Turkish Armed Forces are definitely on 
the receiving end of the debates being argued and the negative 
commentary, and they will make their position and stance perfectly 
clear if needs be. Let nobody have any doubt about this. In short, 
anybody who opposes the idea as stated by the founder of the 
Republic the Great Leader Ataturk of "Happy is the man who says I 
am a Turk!" is an enemy of the Turkish Republic and will stay that 
way. The Turkish Armed Forces remain steadfast in their 
unwavering commitment to carry out in full the duties given to them 
by law to protect these qualities. Its allegiance to and faith in this 
commitment is certain.”178 
 
      This proclamation was similar to other ‘warning letters’ sent to the civilian 
government before the previous coups in 1971 and 1980. In those letters military 
warned the government and staged a coup d’etat subsequently. That is why some 
circles referred to the memorandum of April 27, 2007 as the beginning of the fifth 
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military intervention in the Turkish history. The idea was that, if the government did 
not respond to the military’s demands efficiently, military’s warning on April 27 would 
transform into a full-fledged military takeover in the near future.179 
 
      As a response to memorandum, AKP criticized the military’s guardianship role 
over the politics. The Minister of Justice and government spokesman Cemil Çicek 
expressed his discontent by stating that, “The General Staff is an establishment under 
the Prime Minister's Office. It would be inconceivable if the general staff in a 
democracy upholding the rule of law made a statement critical of the government about 
any issue. The General Staff is an establishment which receives orders from the 
government and whose responsibilities are defined in the Constitution and laws. 
According to the Constitution, the Chief of Staff reports to the Prime Minister as part of 
his duties and responsibilities.”180 Similarly, Military’s attempt to intervene in 
presidential election process was countered with the EU’s criticism. The EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, stated that the EU respected Turkish 
military; however “the military should be aware that it should not interfere in the 
democratic process in a country which desires to become an EU member...It is 
important that the military respects the rules of democracy and its own role in that 
democratic game.”181 
 
      The military could not find the popular support that it had been trying to create 
for the last months. Civil society organizations, media and business circles gave 
significant support to the civilian government vis-à-vis the military. Even participants 
of the demonstrations against the AKP expressed their ambivalence towards the 
military with the slogan: “no Islamic law, but no coup either.”182 Thus, the military did 
not achieve its main objective to organize public, press and non-governmental 
organizations against the AKP government in order to influence the government in its 
decision to choose Abdullah Gül as the presidential candidate. In the light of these 
developments one would argue that, in the previous interventions most citizens were 
comfortable with the military’s role as guardian of democracy and secularism. 
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Military’s actions were seen legitimate in the eyes of the public; however, this time, 
citizens, including both opponents and proponents of AKP, gave the message that the 
military needed to be out of this debate. This is a very important change in the sense 
that legitimacy of the military as an actor in the political realm was questioned by the 
public by giving credence to civilian rule rather than the guardianship role of the 
military. This signifies a change in the image of the military and its functions within the 
society.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
CHANGING BALANCES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS? 
 
 
“The military intervened on May 27, March 12, and September 12. 
Were these interventions successful? No! This shows that military 
interventions are not panacea. From now on we should have 
greater trust in the people’s judgement”183  
 
 
 
3.1 The EU’s political conditionality on the Turkish Military in the post-Helsinki 
Era 
 
      The European Council’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999, where Turkey was 
acknowledged as an official candidate by the EU, was a turning point for the EU-
Turkey relations. Although the EU recognized candidate status of Turkey, the Union 
also put forward some conditions that Turkey needed to satisfy for a successful 
integration. In order to stimulate Turkish government to readjust Turkey’s political 
system in line with the EU norms and standards, the Union began to put more pressure 
on Turkey after the Helsinki Summit. Subsequently, Turkey has pursued an ongoing 
and unprecedented process of domestic political reform. This chapter analyzes the 
reformation process that Turkey has been going through since 1999 by an analysis of 
EU’s progress reports and Turkish governments’ responses to these. 
 
      At the turn of the last decade, political situation in Turkey was not congruent 
with the core European democratic norms and values. As Schimmelfennig et al. state, 
the etatist and nationalist doctrine of the Turkish state was perceived to be alien to 
Western liberal democracy.184 General human rights and the principle of rule of law had 
been systematically violated throughout the last decades. Even though no death 
sentence had been carried out since 1984, death penalty law prevailed and the Turkish 
criminals still ran the risk of being sentenced to death. Torture had been widespread. 
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Freedom of expression, press and association had been constrained deliberately. The 
Existence of the State Security Courts contravened the European standards of fair and 
independent justice. Kurdish minority had been suppressed violently and the rule of 
respect and protection for minority rights had been violated several times. Furthermore, 
guardianship role of the Turkish military and its domination over the civilian 
governments had been in conflict with the principle of democratic control over the 
armed forces embraced by the EU.185 In this respect, status of the chief of general the 
staff under the prime minister, the influence of the NSC on day-to-day politics, and the 
lack of an effective civilian or parliamentary control over the military resulted in 
criticisms directed by the EU. Thus, Turkey needed to restructure its domestic political 
system in line with the Union’s demands.  
 
      Just as the other candidate countries, Turkey was promised to begin accession 
negotiations with the EU provided that the country fulfilled political aspects of the 
Copenhagen Criteria.186 At its meeting in June 1993 the European Council decided that 
for a candidate country to be a full member of the Union, it should achieve stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities.187 These political conditionalities are known as ‘Copenhagen 
Criteria’188. Thereafter, in Luxembourg Meeting in 1997, the Council made it clear that 
“compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a political prerequisite for the 
opening of any accession negotiations.”189 Hence, when Turkey’s candidate status was 
declared in Helsinki Summit, it was also emphasized that it would have to satisfy the 
Copenhagen political criteria so as to begin accession negotiations with the EU. 
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      In order to set out the priority areas for further work in a single frame the EU 
Commission issued its Accession Partnership Document (APD) for Turkey in 
November 2000. As an official response to APD, in Marh 2001, Turkish government 
prepared its National Program for the implementation of universal norms embedded in 
the EU acquis.190 On the basis of these documents the most extensive ‘Europeanization’ 
program in the Turkish history was launched.191 In order to readjust Turkish political 
structure in line with the European demands, various democratization packages have 
been adopted and several constitutional amendments have been passed. Eventually, the 
Union came to the conclusion that Turkey had sufficiently satisfied the Copenhagen 
criteria and opened accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. In October, 
2004 the Commission recommended that accession negotiations with Turkey could be 
launched since it had sufficiently met the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria. 
On the basis of the Commission’s recommendation, the Council declared that accession 
negotiations with Turkey would start in October, 2005. However, the Council also 
emphasized that, if political reforms were halted, then negotiations would be suspended. 
Reforms demanded by the EU in order to apply European standards to the Turkish 
political system enhanced the EU’s control over Turkey. This lends credibility to the 
rationalist institutionalist understanding of ‘logic of consequentialism’ which depicts 
enlargement as a power game “in which the EU seeks to maximize the benefits of an 
expanding membership in terms of economic, political and security gains and, at the 
same time minimize the costs of accepting new members (in terms of budgetary, 
economic and political impact of the new members on the EU’s economy, budget and 
institutions).”192 Through democratic conditionalities the EU reinforced its supervision 
over Turkey and aimed to reshape Turkish political system in a way to minimize the 
costs of integrating Turkey into the Union.     
 
      One of the most controversial issues in the reformation process has been the 
Turkish military, whose dominance and power were challenged by the reforms relating 
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with the National Security Council specifically. Besides constitutional reforms targeting 
the supremacy of military in the political arena directly, other reforms related with 
freedom of expression, press and association, rule of law, respect and protection for 
minority rights, and foreign policy have had impacts on civil-military relations in 
Turkey since they have challenged the status-quo under which the military have 
occupied a privileged place and consolidated its hegemony over the civilian 
governments. In this sense, besides constitutional amendments related with the NSC 
other institutional changes which have had direct and indirect impacts over the military 
and its authority in the political sphere will be presented in the following sections. 
 
 
3.2 Turkey’s Europeanization Process: The Case of the Turkish Military 
 
      Main demands of the EU from Turkey in regard to military have mostly centered 
on reducing the military’s role in the political life and giving civilian authorities greater 
control over the military.193 As it is analyzed in detail above, Turkish military have 
always played a crucial role in Turkish politics as the guardian of Republic and the 
Kemalist regime. In establishing this privileged position the National Security Council, 
through which the military sustains its power and influence in the public policy arena, 
has had primary importance. Determination of threats and the formulation of national 
security policies accordingly were under the responsibilities of NSC. Furthermore, the 
government was required to give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC 
dominated by the military. Thus, “the military has often used the NSC as a platform for 
putting forward its own political agenda. The politically superior position of the NSC 
relative to civilian organs of the government is a serious problem for Turkish-EU 
relations.”194 
 
      In addition, position of the chief of the general staff under the prime minister 
rather than ministry of defense has also been a point of controversy. In contrast to the 
prevailing global principle of democratic control of armed forces which argues that the 
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chief of staff should be responsible to the ministry of defense, Turkish chief of the 
general staff has been responsible to the prime minister since 1961. Furthermore, the 
composition and jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, and the emergency rule in the 
southeast which brought excessive authority for the military in that region have been 
targeted in the EU originating reports and documents on Turkey. By the same token, 
reforms adopted in the post-Helsinki era targeted these problematic issues and brought 
institutional changes for the limitation of the military’s power in the political sphere. 
Parallel to Ladrech’s definition of ‘Europeanization’, throughout this reform process 
European institution building has caused important changes in reorientation of Turkish 
national politics. Similarly, in line with the Radaelli’s analysis of ‘Europeanization’, EU 
oriented policies and actions have had impacts on domestic structures and public policy 
within which the civil-military relations in Turkey and privileged position of the 
military were involved.   
 
 
3.2.1. 1998 Progress Report of the Commission and the EU Demands on Turkey 
 
      The EU’s criticisms of Turkey in regard to democratic control of the military 
and the prominent role of the NSC in domestic policy making mechanism were 
mentioned in the 1998 Progress report of the Commission of the European Union. The 
report stated that “the NSC plays a key role in the formulation and implementation of 
national security policy and also covers a wide range of political matters...The existence 
of this body shows that, despite a basic democratic structure, the Turkish constitution 
allows the Army to play a civil role and to intervene in every area of political life.”195 
One could argue that, in this report EU’s criticisms with respect to the NSC’s role were 
quite strong. Moreover, it was implied that the military’s political role was regarded as a 
major obstacle to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey: 
 
     “The National Security Council demonstrates the major role 
played by the army in political life. The army is not subject to civil 
control and sometimes even appears to act without the government’s 
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knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale repressive military 
operations.”196  
 
      The Commission also expressed its hesitation about the State Security Courts 
(SSC) which dealt with overtly political crimes. It was stated in the Report that these 
courts were not compatible with a democratic system and ran counter to the principles 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) because the nature of these 
courts were incapable of offering defendants a fair trial.197 According to the Report, one 
of the most significant key problem areas of the SSC was the doubts about the 
impartiality of judges. One in three SSC judges was military judges. That is, they were 
serving military personnel and therefore they were subject to military discipline. 
Presence of the military judges resulted in suspicion about the independence and 
efficiency of the SSC. It was also emphasized that, Turkey was the only example in 
Europe in which civilians could be tried at least in part by military judges.198  
 
      On the question of the Turkish Chief of the General Staff being responsible to 
the Prime Minister rather than the Defense Minister, the 1998 report stated that, the two 
operations by the Turkish armed forces against the bases of the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK) in northern Iraq had been carried out without the Chief of Staff giving the 
government any prior notice. 199 It was implied in the Report that, unlike the members 
of the Union, the chief of staff in Turkey was responsible to prime minister which 
rendered it more autonomous and away from effective democratic control. Thus, as far 
as the political situation of Turkey in the last quarter of the 1990s is concerned, the 
Commission concluded that, although “the organization of public authorities had most 
of the basic features of a democratic system”, several factors (like the NSC and the 
SSC) had “prevented these authorities from functioning in the same way as they do in 
the member states of the European Union.”200 
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      The 1998 Report underlined the shortcomings in respect to human rights and the 
protection of minorities. Even the former president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, 
admitted that, it was impossible to say that there was no torture in Turkey.201 Torture 
has been used as an instrument against persons suspected of terrorist crimes as well as 
against common criminals. It is also known that, especially in the times of military rule 
after the 1980 coup, torture became embedded as a method of forcing suspects to 
confess or assume crimes. The Report highlighted that persistent cases of torture, 
disappearance and extra-judicial executions had been regularly recorded despite 
repeated official statements of the government’s commitment to ending such practices.  
 
      Deficiencies in exercising freedom of expression were targeted by the Report. It 
was stated that, freedom of expression was not fully assured in Turkey. “An excessively 
narrow interpretation of the constitution and other legal provisions concerning the unity 
of the state, territorial integrity, secularism and respect for formal institutions of the 
state is regularly used to charge and sentence elected politicians, journalists, writers, 
trade unionists or NGO workers for statements, public speeches, published articles or 
books that would be acceptable in EU member states.”202 In fact, according to Articles 
22-26 of the Turkish Constitution, everyone has the right to freedom of communication, 
freedom of residence and movement, freedom of conscience, religious belief and 
conviction, freedom of thought and opinion and the right to disseminate his/her 
thoughts and opinions.203 Article 27 decrees that, everyone has right to study and teach 
freely, explain and disseminate science and arts and to carry out research in these fields. 
Moreover, Article 28 states that the press is free and shall not be censored. Article 33 
states that everyone has the right to form associations without prior permission, 
whereas Article 34 confirms the right to hold peaceful meetings and demonstrations 
marches without prior permission. Last but not least, Article 40 of the constitution 
states that fundamental rights and freedoms are protected by law. However, as Hale 
indicates, the 1982 Constitution, enacted under the military regime of 1980-83, 
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imposed severe restrictions on the actual exercise of these rights.204 For instance, the 
original text of Article 13 stated that: 
 
“Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in 
conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim 
of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory 
and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, 
public order, general peace, the public interest public morals and 
public health, and also for specific reasons set forth in the relevant 
Articles of the Constitution.” 
 
           Furthermore, original text of the Article 14 extended the conditions under which 
fundamental rights and freedoms were limited: 
 
“None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution may 
be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the 
State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the 
Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and 
freedoms, of placing the government of the State under the control of 
an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of 
one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis 
of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other 
means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas. 
Sanctions to be applied against those who violate these prohibitions, 
and those who incite and provoke others to the same end shall be 
determined by law.” 
 
      Therefore, on the basis of its self-assigned role of guardianship, Turkish armed 
forces made it clear that fundamental rights and freedoms would be limited and 
restricted if any action was in clash with the parameters of the national security defined 
by the military. Controlling and limiting freedom of expression was crucial for the 
military to prevent promotion and consolidation of unwanted ideologies among the 
citizens. 
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      As far as the problem of freedom of expression is concerned, two prominent 
legal provisions of the Penal Code (Article 159 and 312) and Article 8 of the Law for 
the Struggle against Terrorism of 1991 need to be mentioned. These statutes used to be 
referred frequently by the courts to restrict freedom of expression.205 The original text 
of the Article 159 provided that, “those who publicly insult or deride the moral 
character of Turkishness, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly [GNA], or the 
Government, or the Ministers, the military or security forces of the State, or the moral 
character of the judiciary, shall be punished by between one and six years of severe 
imprisonment.”206 On the other hand, according to the original wording of Penal Code 
Article 312, “anyone who openly incites the public to hatred and enmity with regard to 
class, race, religion, religious sect or regional differences shall be punished by between 
one and three years of imprisonment.”207 In addition to these, in its original text, Article 
8 of the Law for the Struggle against Terrorism declared that “Regardless of with 
whatever method, aim or purpose, written or oral propaganda, together with meetings, 
demonstrations and marches which have the objective of destroying the indivisible 
integrity of the State of the Republic of Turkey, with its territory and nation, shall not 
be carried out.”208  
 
          Not only individuals, but also political parties were subject to certain limitations 
and restrictions. 4th paragraph of the Article 68 of the constitution, which outlines the 
rights and duties of political parties, states that: “Statutes and programs of political 
parties may not be in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory 
and nation, human rights, national sovereignty, and the principles of the democratic and 
secular Republic”. Article 69 explains under what conditions political parties would be 
punished by certain sanctions or closed permanently: “If the status or the program of a 
political party is determined to contravene the provisions of the fourth paragraph of 
Article 68 of the Constitution, then that political party is dissolved permanently. The 
dissolution of a political party on grounds of contravention of the fourth paragraph of 
Article 68 may only be adjudged by the Constitutional Court if it is determined by the 
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same that said political party has become a focal point of activities in such 
contravention” (emphasis added). Pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP), forced to resign 
from the coalition government by a military intervention in February 1997, was closed 
down by the Constitutional Court in 1998 on the basis of Articles 68-69.209 Similarly, its 
successor, the Virtue Party (WP), suffered the same fate in 2001. Besides Islamist 
parties, pro-Kurdish parties like the Democracy Party (DEP) and the People’s 
Democracy Party (HADEP) were accused of being focal points of activities against the 
indivisible integrity of the State and dissolved by the Constitutional Court. 
 
      For many years in Turkey, these legal provisions were used in order to restrict 
freedom of expression and association, specifically for those who supported dissident 
views on the Kurdish or Islamist issues which had been deemed as the most sensitive 
national security issues by the military.210 As the founder of the 1982 Constitution and 
the post-1980 political culture in Turkey, these above mentioned restrictions have 
served for the military to impose and consolidate its political power and authority over 
the citizenry. In this context, reforms in regard to these restrictions are important as far 
as the military and its political predominance is concerned. 
 
Aforementioned legal provisions and other restrictions on fundamental freedoms 
were judged quite contrary to human right standards embraced by the EU. In order to 
catalyze reformation process in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the Accession Partnership Document demanded Turkey to strengthen “legal and 
constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of expression in line with Article 10 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights.”211 Moreover, it was also mentioned that, 
the government needed to “strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees of the right to 
freedom of association and peaceful assembly and encourage development of civil 
society.” The APD also called for further measures “to reinforce the fight against torture 
practices...[to]  strengthen opportunities for legal redress against all violations of human 
rights...[to] improve the functioning and the efficiency of the judiciary...[and to] remove 
any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in 
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TV/radio broadcasting.”  To put it in a nutshell, priority of the EU in order to transform 
Turkey in line with the EU norms and values was to induce necessary changes in 
Turkey so as to “guarantee in law and in practice the full enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms by all individuals without discrimination and irrespective of 
language, race, color, sex, political opinion, religion or belief in line with relevant 
international and European instruments to which Turkey is a party.”212  
 
      The EU’s stance towards Turkey was clearly expressed with the concluding 
sentence of the 1999 Commission Report: “although the basic features of a democratic 
system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria.”213 
Therefore, in order to be recognized as a prospective member of the Union, Turkey 
needed to curb the military’s prominent role in the political arena and to put it under 
democratic control of the civilian government. Shortcomings in terms of protection of 
minorities and human rights needed to be resolved. Restrictions on fundamental 
freedoms embedded in the constitution had to be abolished and redesigned in 
accordance with the European Human Rights Convention. Improvements in respect to 
independence and efficiency of the judiciary needed to be realized. Last but not least, 
death penalty had to be lifted. In short, Turkey required to launch a comprehensive 
‘democratization’ and ‘Europeanization’ project to be compatible with the European 
norms and standards. However, predicted reforms that needed to be passed in order to 
achieve this aim brought up the dominant cleavages in Turkey between the Turkish 
nationalism and Kurds; and between the secular and pro-Islamist conservative groups 
into agenda once again.214 Turkish military had reservations about liberalizing reforms 
which, according to the armed forces, would soften the restrictions on the Kurdish and 
Islamist groups and would give them a freer hand to expand their activities.  
 
    Looking from historical perspective, it would be possible to argue that in terms 
of its attitude towards democratization, Turkish military had created a bad impression 
due to its authoritarian rule, repression and the violation of human rights.215 According 
to Rouleau, Turkish military’s attitude towards ‘democratization’ was illuminated with 
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a 1995 statement by Deputy Chief of Staff Ahmet Görekçi, when he announced that the 
army would “not allow itself to be bound hand and foot by democracy and human 
rights.”216 The EU and proponents of liberalizing reforms believe that threats of political 
Islam and ethnic separatism can be successfully tackled if Turkey had a more liberal 
and democratic system of government. However, the military believe that “these 
reforms would considerably weaken Turkey’s hand in its struggle against the ‘lingering’ 
twin threats of political Islam and Kurdish separatism.”217 In this manner, the reform 
process which has enabled Turkey to take important steps in the fields of consolidation 
of democracy and human/minority rights is also meaningful in terms of evolution of 
civil-military relations in Turkey. During the reform process (analyzed below) dominant 
role of the military was targeted through reforms related with the NSC. Furthermore, 
democratic control over the military tried to be consolidated. Besides these, despite the 
military’s clear opposition to the reforms on fundamental freedoms and human/minority 
rights, these reforms have been passed successfully. This, in a sense, signifies a change 
in the balance of civil-military relations. Turkish governments have adopted 
breakthrough political changes in order to satisfy the political aspects of the 
Copenhagen criteria. Turkey’ progress in consolidating its democracy and restructuring 
its political system in line with the EU demands has been commendable. Although the 
military was reluctant to espouse some of these reforms on the basis of national security 
concerns, it has been convinced, at least in principle that the last word belongs to 
civilians. Turkey’s bid for EU membership has been the primary factor which made a 
more continent relationship between the military and civilians possible. As the 
‘Europeanization’ theory provided in Chapter 1 suggests, institutional changes on the 
basis of EU conditionalities challenged the position of the military in the political arena 
and took initiatory steps towards the introduction of a civil-military relations similar to 
EU member states.    
 
      It is possible to argue that; majority of the Turkish population supported their 
country’s struggle for membership. Most of the leading civil society associations, like 
the Association of Industrialists and Businessmen of Turkey (TUSIAD), gave support to 
Europeanization process wholeheartedly since they regarded Turkey’s accession to the 
EU as the best guarantee for the further flourishing of liberal democracy in Turkey. 
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Under such conditions, the Turkish military, considered as the ‘foremost modernizer’218 
of Turkish society, would be in sharp contrast with the ideals of modernization and 
Westernization if it had opposed the Europeanization project by attempting to block the 
reform process through formal and/or informal mechanisms. Hence, the military’s 
rhetorical commitment to Westernization and integration with the EU led the military to 
comply with the reforms although the suggested reforms were a threat to the military’s 
privileged place in the political arena. Here, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Type I) is 
applicable in analyzing the Turkish military’s attitude towards the process of reform. As 
quoted in Chapter 1, Checkel argues that, actors sometimes behave appropriately by 
learning a role irrespective of whether they like the role agree with it. Being a part of 
European Union has been the most serious modernization/Westernization project of 
modern Turkey. In this context, it would be possible to argue that, traditionally known 
as one of the most important elements of Turkish modernization, Turkish military found 
itself obliged to accept the EU originated reforms although it did not agree with the 
content of the reforms in essence. Because acting in an opposite manner would have 
eroded the legitimacy of the Turkish military in the eyes of Turkish citizens who 
supports Turkey’s bid for EU membership. Thus, Turkey’s steady and significant 
progress in meeting requirements for EU membership in the post-Helsinki era has 
resulted in important ramifications in regard to civil-military relations. 
 
 
3.2.2 Amendments in Regard to the Armed Forces 
 
      Not much had changed in the 1999 Report in terms of the EU’s criticisms of 
Turkey with respect to democratic control of the military and the political role of the 
NSC in the 1998 Report. The main, perhaps the only, legislative change in the civil 
military relations between 1998 and 1999 was related with the judicial system. In June 
1999, constitutional and legal amendments removing the military judge in the SSCs 
were adopted by the TGNA and entered into force. Although there were serious doubts 
about the reliability of these courts, the Commission deemed this reform as an 
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improvement in the functioning of the SSC. The Regular Report of the Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, dated October, 13, 1999, stated that: 
 
“Through the National Security Council, the military continues to 
have an important influence in many areas of political life. The 
National Security Council continues to play a major role in political 
life. While the emergency courts system remains in place, the 
replacement of the military judge by a civilian one in the State 
Security Courts, represents a clear improvement in terms of 
independence of the judiciary.”219 
 
      The EU explicitly addressed aforementioned deficiencies in Turkish democracy 
and civil-military relations through the Accession Partnership Document. In the APD 
the EU demanded from Turkey to “align the constitutional role of the National Security 
Council as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU 
member states...[and to] lift the state of emergency in the South-East.”220 Furthermore, 
the EU required the Turkish government to “abolish the death penalty...[and to] ensure 
cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their 
origin.”221 
 
      With the ‘1st harmonization package’ of October 2001, which included thirty 
four amendments to the existing constitution, Turkey began to prepare the ground to 
meet its Accession Partnership priorities. One of the most important alteration in regard 
to the military was about the Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution. Article 118, as 
mentioned above, was stating that the Council of Ministers should give priority 
consideration to the decisions of the NSC concerning national security related subjects. 
With the amendment constitutional status of the NSC was changed. Now, the Article 
118, as amended on October 17, 2001, states that: 
 
“The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of the 
Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that are taken and 
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ensuring the necessary condition with regard to the formulation, 
establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of 
the state. The Council of Ministers shall evaluate decisions of the 
National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems 
necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of 
the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace 
and security of society.”222 (emphasis added) 
 
      Therefore, the role of the NSC was limited to recommendations and the 
government became responsible to evaluate the recommendations rather than giving 
them priority consideration.223 One would argue that, with the amendment, the quasi-
executive and supervisory powers of the NSC were challenged by reducing the role of 
the Council to an advisory/consultative body. Furthermore, besides the role of the NSC, 
composition of the Council was also amended in order to make the civilian members 
majority. While the number of military members remained five, the number of civilian 
members of the NSC was increased from five to nine.224  This change in the provision 
of Article 118 was esteemed by the EU; however, it was also stated in the 
Commission’s Progress Report 2001 that the extent to which the constitutional 
amendment would enhance de facto civilian control over the military would need to be 
monitored.  
 
      As part of the package of constitutional amendments promulgated in October 
2001, important changes to various articles of the 1982 Constitution, which 
consolidated the authority of the military rule over civilians after the coup, were 
realized. Original texts of Articles 13-14, related with restrictions over the fundamental 
freedoms, were also amended. The new version of Article 13 states that:  
 
“Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and 
in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of 
the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. These 
restrictions shall not be in conflict with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order of the 
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society  and the secular Republic and  the principle of 
proportionality.”225 
 
      Similarly, previous text of the Article 14 was converted into the following:  
        
“None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall 
be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the 
state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of 
the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon 
human rights. No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted 
in a manner that enables the State or individuals to destroy the 
fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution  or to 
stage an activity with the aim of restricting them more extensively 
than stated in the Constitution. The sanctions to be applied against 
those who perpetrate these activities in conflict with these provisions 
shall be determined by law.”226 
 
      Thus, these amendments would be deemed as attempts to bring Articles 13-14 
into rough correspondence with Articles 10-11 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, by “shortening the list of unconstitutional aims mentioned in the previous 
version of article 14.”227 Moreover, Article 69, which stated principles to be observed 
by political parties, was amended in order to clarify under what conditions a political 
party could be regarded as a center for the execution of activities contrary to the 
provisions of Article 68, which could be the basis for the permanent closure of  a 
political party by the constitutional court. It was added to the article that, for a political 
party to be castigated for being the center of activities contrary to the provisions of 
Article 68, such actions would have to be “carried out intensively by the members of 
that party” or “shared implicitly or explicitly by the grand congress, general 
chairmanship, the central decision-making, administrative organs of that party, by the 
group’s general meeting or group executive board at the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly.” Furthermore, it was added that, as an alternative to closure, “the 
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Constitutional Court may rule the concerned party to be deprived of State aid wholly or 
in part with respect to intensity of the actions brought before the court.”228 
 
      These amendments testified a broad based political will for EU membership in 
Turkey. New provisions were introduced in line with the priorities of National Program 
for the Adoption of Acquis, such as the freedom of thought and expression, the 
prevention of torture, strengthening of democracy and civilian control, the freedom and 
security of the individual. Expected utility for Turkey in undertaking these reforms was 
the EU membership. This situation gives credibility to the ‘logic of consequentialism’ 
thesis, which argues that actors behave according to their expected material costs and 
benefits. With the aim of being a part of the EU, ‘logic of consequentialism’ has been 
the principle logic behind the Turkey’s process of reform in the post-Helsinki era.  
 
  In addition to these constitutional changes, ‘1st Harmonization Package’ 
included a series of amendments to the Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law as well. As a 
result of these reforms Articles 159 and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code and Articles 7-8 
of the Anti-Terror Law were amended. Under the successful amendment to Article 312, 
statements which incite the public to hatred and enmity on the basis of differences of 
social class, race, religion, sect or region, began to be count as a crime provided that 
they were delivered “in a way that may be dangerous for public order.”229 This 
amendment was realized in order to narrow the scope of the Article 312. As a result of 
amendments dealing with the Article 159, maximum punishment for statements that 
insult the State, State institutions and Turkishness reduced from six to three years. In 
the same manner, fines imposed for criticizing Turkish laws and institutions were 
abolished unless they intended to insult or deride those laws and institutions. Changes 
to Articles 7-8 of the Anti Terror Law introduced the notion of “propaganda with the 
terrorist organization in a way that encourages the use of terrorist methods.”  Therefore, 
the scope of Article 8 was narrowed by expressing that for a meeting, demonstration or 
propaganda to be regarded as a crime it needed to be ascertained that the act was 
encouraging the use of terrorist methods.  These amendments were essential markers of 
Turkey’s desire to adjust its political system in line with the EU Acquis by abolishing 
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some restrictions on human rights and fundamental freedoms survived from the 1982 
Constitution of the military rule. However, for a more satisfying improvement in 
consolidation of democracy and human rights, these amendments needed to be 
deepened and implemented neatly. 
 
      A series of reforms under the ‘1st Harmonization Package’, which became the 
center of criticisms coming from the military was about the improvement of cultural 
rights of Kurds. Kurdish population in Turkey was officially recognized as full and 
normal citizens of Turkey, because the Turkish state accepted as minorities only those 
groups who were defined as such in the Treaty of Lousanne of 1923. Since the Kurds 
were not accepted as minority, they were entitled to no special privileges enjoyed by 
minority groups like non-Muslim Armenians, Greeks and Jews. The EU demanded 
Turkey to take steps in order to abolish existing restrictive legislation and practices 
which refrains Kurdish population from enjoying their cultural rights. In the Progress 
Report of 2000, it was stated that, “cultural rights for all Turks, irrespective of their 
ethnic origin, such as the right to broadcast in their mother tongue, to learn in their 
mother tongue or to receive instructions in their mother tongue” needed to be 
guaranteed. Articles 26 and 28 were amended in an attempt to provide Kurdish people 
with more rights to enjoy their culture. Original text of the Article 26 stated that, “No 
language prohibited by law may be used in the expression and dissemination of 
thought.” On the other hand, Article 28, affecting the press, decreed that, “publication 
may not be made in any language prohibited by law.” Thanks to constitutional 
amendments of October 2001, these provisions forbidding the use of languages 
prohibited by law were abolished. Further reforms were realized in August 2002. The 
possibility of broadcasting in different languages and dialects used traditionally by 
Turkish citizens in their daily lives were allowed. Similarly, amendment regarding the 
Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching provided for the “possibility of 
learning different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their 
daily lives and of opening private courses for that purpose on the condition that this 
does not contradict the indivisible integrity of the State.”230 
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      As a further step towards meeting the EU’s criteria, ‘State of Emergency’ in the 
provinces where Kurdish people constitute the majority was ended. This was an 
important development in the sense that, the role of military as the virtual rulers in 
much of the southeast came to an end by leaving the office to civilian rulers.231  In spite 
of these improvements and increasing tolerance within the society, people in Kurdish 
provinces still experience difficulties in social, political, and cultural life. People whose 
mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn their mother tongue in Turkish public 
schooling system. Such education can only be provided by private educational 
institutions; yet, in the case of Kurdish, all such institutions were closed because of 
financial difficulties. Although there are some deficiencies in regard to scope and 
implementation of reforms with respect to cultural rights of Kurdish groups, there has 
been important progress throughout the last few years. At the beginning, especially the 
military elite argued that reforms in the areas of human, minority, and cultural rights 
would be too costly for the national security of Turkey. It was believed that the cost of 
compliance with the EU demands would be excessively high since reforms covering 
cultural rights have enabled separatist Kurdish groups to act more freely than before.232 
However, it would be safe to argue that, unlike what was predicted by military elite, 
aforementioned reforms dealing with human rights, minority rights and fundamental 
freedoms have not led to proliferation of separatist movements and activities. 
 
3.3. Second set of Amendments to the NSC 
 
      With the ‘7th Harmonization Package’, more comprehensive reforms in respect 
to the NSC were introduced in order to align relations between civil-military authorities 
with the practices of EU member states. In 2001, the advisory nature of the NSC was 
confirmed with an amendment in the Article 118 which also increased the number of 
civilians in the NSC. However, the ‘7th Harmonization Package’ adopted in July, 2003 
expanded the scope of reforms related with the duties, functioning and composition of 
the NSC.233 Article 4 of the Law on the National Security Council and the Secretariat 
General of the National Security Council was amended to revise the duties and 
                                                 
231
 W. Hale, (2003) 
232
 N. Tocci, (2005) 
233
 European Commission Report, 2003 
 83 
competence of the Council to prevent the misinterpretation of its advisory role.  An 
amendment to the Articles 9 and 14 of the Law on the National Security Council 
abolished the extended executive and supervisory powers of the Secretary General of 
the NSC. In particular, the provision which “empowered the Secretary General of the 
NSC to follow up, on behalf of the President and the Prime Minister, the 
implementation of any recommendation made by the NSC” was abolished. The 
package appealed the Article 19 of the Law. Article 19, which provided that “the 
Ministries, public institutions and organizations and private legal persons shall submit 
regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents 
needed by the Secretariat General of the National Security Council”, had given the 
NSC an unlimited access to civilian agencies. Furthermore, it was decided that, the post 
of Secretary General would no longer be reserved exclusively for a military person. 
Consequently, in August 2004, Mehmet Yiğit Alpogan, a career diplomat who served 
as Turkish ambassador to Greece, was appointed as the first civilian Secretary General 
of the NSC.234 The frequency of the NSC meetings was modified and reduced to once 
in two months rather than meeting once a month. Number of departments under the 
authority of Secretary General was reduced and the surplus personnel were transferred 
to other state departments. In order to enhance the transparency of defense 
expenditures, the Court of Auditors was authorized to audit accounts and transactions 
of all type of organizations including the state properties owned by the armed forces. 
This allowed, if not full at least greater, supervision over the military budget. 
Furthermore, the NSC’s budget was decreased by 60 percent.235  
 
According to Cizre, this reform package was in itself a distinct legislative 
accomplishment as it specifically targeted curbing the powers of the NSC and repealing 
the NSC’s executive powers by converting the NSC into an advisory body.236 The 7th 
package also included a number of amendments in regard to the jurisdiction of military 
courts over civilians. The amendment to Article 11 of the Law on the Establishment 
and Trial Procedures of Military Courts “removed cases related to criminal offences 
such as inciting soldiers to mutiny and disobedience, discouraging the public from 
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military duty and undermining national resistance from the jurisdiction of military 
courts, if these offences are committed by civilians.”237 In addition to this reform 
package, two more amendments were enacted before the European Council meeting of 
December 2004. Firstly, military representatives were removed from the Higher 
Education Board (YÖK). Secondly, the State Security Courts, deemed to be 
incompatible with the judicial system in the EU, were abolished. Since these 
institutions were introduced by the military rule following the 1980 coup, both 
institutions were symbols of the shadow of the military authority over the civilian 
agencies. In the same vein, the Commission Report of 2003 concluded that, “the above 
mentioned amendments could significantly modify the functioning of the National 
Security Council. In order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU 
member states, it is important that these reforms are effectively implemented, for 
military representation to be withdrawn from civilian bodies and for Parliament to 
ensure full control on the defense budget.”     
 
 
3.4. Tracing Turkey’s Europeanization Process 
 
      Since 2001 Turkey has enacted nine harmonization packages so as to comply 
with the EU standards. Although there were certain problems in the implementation of 
some reforms, these nine packages have all brought an unprecedented process of 
change in the Turkish political system towards a more democratic and liberal 
environment. ‘1st Harmonization Package’, entered into force on February 19, 2002, 
brought a series of changes to the Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law and the State 
Security Courts. ‘2nd Harmonization Package’, came into force on April 9, 2002, was 
composed of reforms that enhanced the exercise of the freedom of expression, 
association and peaceful assembly. Under this package, the Press Law, the Law on 
Political Parties, the Law on Associations and the Law on Meetings and Demonstration 
Marches, the Law on Civil Servants were amended.  
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‘3rd Harmonization Package’, entered into force on August 9, 2002, abolished 
death penalty. The death penalty, not enforced since 1984, was converted into prison 
sentences and it was decided that the death penalty was no longer to be enforced except 
in times of war and the imminent threat of war. Moreover, further improvements in the 
areas of freedom of expression and association were realized with the amendments to 
the Law on Associations, the Law on Meetings and Demonstration Marches, Press 
Law, the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises, and the Law 
on Foreign Language Teaching and Education as well as the Law on the Duties and 
Competence of the Police. ‘4th Harmonization Package’, came into force on January 11, 
2003, engendered significant changes in relevant codes in order to thwart torture and 
ill-treatment. For instance, “Article 2 of the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants 
and Public Employees was amended to abolish the permission procedure for the 
prosecution of civil servants and public employees for allegations of torture and ill 
treatment. An amendment to Article 245 of the Penal Code provided that sentences for 
torture and ill treatment may not be converted into fines or any other measures and may 
not be suspended.”238 With the ‘5th Harmonization Package’, which entered into force 
on February 4, 2003, provisions on freedom of association and retrial were enacted. ‘6th 
Harmonization Package’, entered into force on July 19, 2003, put significant changes 
into effect in the context of the expansion of the freedom of expression, safeguard 
provisions on the rights of prisoners, religious freedom, and right to life and retrial. ‘7th 
Harmonization Package’, which came into force on August 7, 2003,  brought further 
improvements in the fields of the expansion of the freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, safeguard provisions on the rights of prisoners, religious freedom, rights of 
the child, cultural rights, civil-military relations and the functionality of the executive. 
‘8th Harmonization Package’ of March 3, 2004 brought certain changes to Municipality 
Law and Law of Intellectual Property Rights in order to prevent unlawful production 
and distribution of products like musical, literary and artistic works. ‘9th Harmonization 
Package’, which entered into force on July 14, 2004, contained provisions which aimed 
at some modifications in civil-military relations and death penalty. Thanks to the 
amendment of the law on Higher Education, the provision which allowed the General 
Staff to select one member of the Higher Education Council was repealed. Moreover, 
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with the amendments of the Law on Establishment of and Broadcasting by Radio and 
Television Corporations, Law on Wireless Communication and Law on the Protection 
of Minors from Harmful Publications; application which gave the NSC to nominate one 
member to competent boards was ended. Death penalty, which had been abolished 
except for in times of war and cases of terrorist crime, was abolished in all 
circumstances and replaced with aggravated life imprisonment. Turkish military had 
made its suspicion about the abrogation of death penalty publicly known and argued 
that such a move may boost terrorism and separatist movements.239 However, in 
accordance with the EU demands, civilian government actualized de jure moratorium 
of the death penalty. Thus, Europeanization, taken from the perspective of institutional 
change in this thesis, of the Turkish political structure enabled Turkey to take steps 
towards a domestic political system embraced by the European Union. 
 
      In sum, parallel to EU’s ‘reinforcement by reward’ principle, Turkey was 
offered EU membership carrot provided that it underwent a comprehensive 
‘Europeanization’ and ‘democratization’ process. Because of the EU’s stimulation, 
Turkey has adopted breakthrough political changes and has shown a significant 
progress in transforming its domestic political system in line with the EU’s democratic 
conditionalities. The process of change triggered by the recognition of Turkey’s 
candidacy status has had direct and indirect impacts over the democratization of civil-
military relations in Turkey. Constitutional amendments and legal reforms introduced 
as part of EU harmonization packages, such as the reorganization of the role and 
composition of the NSC, the abolishment of the SSC, the termination of the state of 
emergency in the South Eastern provinces of Turkey directly influenced the power of 
military in the political arena and regarded as important steps in a way to put the armed 
forces under democratic control. On the other hand, other reforms in regard to human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, and cultural rights have led to positive side effects on the 
civil-military relations. Although the military was hesitant in implementing reforms in 
certain areas such as broadcasting and education in the Kurdish language, abolishment 
of death penalty, and freedom of expression on the grounds that these reforms would 
strengthen the Islamist movements and separatist activities, it has shown respect to the 
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supremacy of the civilians over these issues by leaving the last word to the government 
in the decision making process.  
 
Moreover, the liberal environment created by the reforms enacted to consolidate 
Turkish democracy, gave the opportunity to politicians and journalists to question some 
“taboo subjects” in respect to military. For instance, Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of 
Motherland Party (ANAP), indirectly blamed the military for behaving obsessively in 
their exhaustive understanding of national security.240 In other words, the military was 
no longer above public scrutiny. This tendency has also been observed when some civil 
society groups and political parties pronounced their criticisms through mass media 
instruments in regard to the e-memorandum of the military in April 2007. That is, the 
idea of the supremacy of civilian rule over the military was enhanced as a result of 
reforms adopted by the government. Legitimacy of the presence of the military in the 
political arena started to be questioned publicly. In this context, one would argue that, 
institutional changes slowly began norm diffusion. Reforms adopted as a result of the 
adaptational pressure exerted by the EU have given the other actors a freer hand in 
raising their voices and sharing their opinions in regard to privileged position of the 
military in the Turkish political arena. Therefore, in the post-Helsinki era civilian 
governments and military has created a concordant relationship in order to reach their 
common target: the EU membership. The EU pressure has been the most prominent 
factor in the formation of more favorable civil-military relations and in the diminution 
of military’s role in the political era. In this sense, as Heper concludes, “at this stage of 
Europeanization, we witnessed both the further liberalization of the political regime and 
the increased democratization of civil-military relations.”241 
 
3.5. Understanding the Reform Process from the Military’s Perspective 
 
      Despite the fact that the Turkish military still enjoys significant political powers, 
we observed throughout the last years that remarkable changes in favor of the civilians 
have occurred in civil-military relations in Turkey. Reforms induced by the EU 
contributed to the establishment of the civilian supremacy over the military in the 
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political sphere. That is, the institutional changes has given birth to dramatic changes 
which are abhorrent to the military’s material interests since its authority and power in 
the political arena have been undermined. As it is mentioned above, in the history of 
modern Turkey military has always made use of formal and informal mechanisms in 
order to preserve its authority and power in the political realm. Although the material 
interests of the military have been seriously challenged by the latest reforms, the 
military refrained from impeding the Europeanization process. Reasons behind the 
military’s moderate attitude towards the reform process can be tied to the military’s 
concern over the ideational interests and potential social costs of blocking reforms.242 
 
      As Cizre highlights, throughout the 1990s Turkish politics was confronted with 
two conflicting developments. On the one hand, the Turkish military consolidated its 
self-assigned guardianship role and reinforced its political dominance as a reaction to 
strengthening Islamist and separatist movements. On the other hand, the European 
Union prescribed a series of democratic conditionalities that needed to be fulfilled if 
Turkey is to gain successful entry into the club.243 It was a paradoxical situation in the 
sense that in order to maintain its guardianship role, the Turkish military required 
preserving its privileged position over the political system. Whereas the provision of 
civilian supremacy and democratic control over the military were indispensable criteria 
for the membership. Eventually, constitutional and legislative reforms, catalyzed by the 
EU, have resulted in serious repercussions in respect to Turkish civil-military relations. 
As some scholars argue, with the reform packages, “the powers of the NSC were 
dramatically reduced and parliamentary and civil control over the military was 
increased.”244 Thus, the military, a veto player in the Turkish political system, has 
reoriented its position towards civilian agencies and did not block these reforms which 
were designed to undermine the authority and autonomous role of the military in 
Turkish political structure. 
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3.5.1. The Government vs. the Military 
 
      As it was explained in the 1st Chapter, change process is initiated by an internal 
or external factor that shifts the power structures within which the institutional actors, 
like the military and civilian agencies are embedded.245 In the case of Turkish military, 
the Europeanization process on the basis of political conditions enforced by the EU has 
been the external factor which disturbed the balance of power between the military and 
civilians. In this sense, “the EU, as an external reference point, played the role of 
legitimizer in the domestic politics” and this role “empowered the civilian rhetoric.”246 
Hence, the civilian side, benefiting from the shift of paradigm in the domestic politics, 
began to demand the embodiment of more democratic norms. Therefore, the EU was 
crucial in the sense that the power structures among political actors in the domestic 
sphere were altered thanks to the pressure put in force by the EU. Reforms which aimed 
consolidation of democracy and creation of a more liberal political environment gave 
birth to emergence of opportunities for those who opted for a more civilian oriented 
political system by pushing the armed forces back to barracks. Thus, as Güney and 
Karatekelioğlu conclude, the EU came to the forefront as an important external agent 
which initiated this change process in the allocation of power among the institutional 
actors.247  
 
      After the initiation of institutional change, alteration of power structures is 
followed by the bargaining process among actors for the formation of an alternative 
balance on the basis of new power configurations. For instance, the AKP government, 
as an actor within this structure, has strongly supported Turkey’s bid for the EU 
membership. Although the AKP, as a political movement, was born from the ashes of a 
pro-Islamist party, its leaders have frequently argued that they experienced a 
transformation and became compatible with the main principles of the Turkish 
Republic, like secularism. With this transformation, unlike its predecessors, the AKP 
government has adopted a much more supportive rhetoric on Turkey’s EU 
                                                 
245
 J. Stacey & B. Rittberger, (2003) “Dynamics of Formal and Informal Institutional Change” Journal of 
European Public Policy Vol. 10 No. 6 pp. 858-883 
246
 Z. Sarıgil, (2007) p. 46 
247
 A. Güney & P. Karatekelioğlu, (2005)  
 90 
membership248 while keeping a distance from its background. Some argue that, one of 
the most important factors which made the AKP government ambitious for the EU 
membership was the EU’s liberalism, democracy, human rights and free market system 
values that are also embraced by the AKP. On the other hand, some scholars, 
politicians, and military elite would argue that, the AKP, akin to its predecessors, is a 
pro-Islamist party and the main motivation behind the AKP’s desire to integrate Turkey 
with the EU was to undermine the power of military through constitutional and 
legislative reforms. In the Turkish political system, especially in the 1990s, the strongly 
secular military has always been suspicious about the pro-Islamists and their presence 
in the political arena.249 Political movements of the Islamic groups have been limited 
and restricted by the military occasionally. Pro-Islamist parties such as, the National 
Outlook Party (1970-1971), the National Salvation Party (1972-1980), the Welfare 
Party (1987-1997), and the Virtue Party (1998-2001) were closed with the influence of 
military for constituting a threat to principle of secularism of the Turkish Republic. In 
this sense, “Islamic political groups considered the Europeanization process as a great 
opportunity to reduce the political powers of the military.”250 According to this 
argument, by reducing the power of military, the AKP government aimed to promote 
religious freedom and reinforce the influence of Islam and Islamic groups in politics. 
Therefore, this argument underlines the material gains that the AKP would possibly 
acquire after the reforms demanded by the EU have been realized. In this sense, the 
material utilities are considered as the main aim of the AKP government when adopting 
Europeanization process; that is, the ‘logic of consequentialism’ dimension outweighed 
the ideational interests. Therefore, according to this point of view, the AKP aimed to 
benefit from the liberal environment created by the EU induced reforms in order to 
disseminate and implement its pro-Islamist ideologies throughout the country. In other 
words, according to this view, the AKP government has been guided by the ‘logic of 
consequentialism’ which gives priority to the benefits that the AKP government would 
acquire when a more liberal political environment within which the role of the military 
is limited is created. 
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      As it was mentioned above, the military was highly concerned about the 
consequences of reforms that were adopted in order to constrain its influence in politics 
and to bring it under democratic control. From the perspective of military, these 
reforms meant that, dominance of military and military ideology in judiciary, executive, 
education, local governments and media has been challenged seriously. The role of 
NSC has reduced to an advisory body, SSC has been abolished, state of emergency in 
certain provinces has been lifted, military budget has been put under parliamentary 
control...etc. All of these developments have led to weakening power of the armed 
forces in the political arena. Furthermore, other reforms in respect to cultural rights, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms aimed to transform the legacies of military 
rule after the 1980 coup into a more democratic, liberal political culture. In this sense, 
the restrictive political culture produced by the military through the 1982 constitution 
has been challenged. Actually, the high ranking military officials expressed their 
reservations about the reforms concerning the NSC and criticized the government for 
taking steps that would result in unfavorable results in the future.251 Criticisms directed 
to the government were centered around the argument that, with the reforms Turkish 
military was rendered powerless and this made Turkey open to threats coming from 
internal and external factors. For instance, the then Secretary General of the NSC, 
General Tuncer Kılınç, believed that the NSC was weakened and rendered functionless 
for the sake of democracy and the EU. He also expressed his concerns about the AKP 
government and its reforms with the following statement: 
 
“The changes made in the Act on the Fight against Terrorism would 
no longer have a deterrence effect on the perpetrators of those 
crimes; TV broadcasting in Kurdish would incite ethnic separatism; 
the admitting to Turkey the observers during elections would mean 
granting capitulations to foreigners.”252 
 
      On an earlier occasion, General Kılınç had given the impression that instead of 
struggling for the EU membership Turkey had to turn its face to other alternatives. He 
suggested that, “Turkey should perhaps seek other alignments with such countries Iran 
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and Russia.”253 Furthermore, Mustafa Ağaoğlu, the attendee in the Parliament’ 
Constitutional Commission on behalf of the secretary-general, reflected reservations of 
the military about the NSC reform by stating that: 
 
  [With the suggested reform] the NSC Secretariat-General is 
effectively abolished. It will no longer be able to fulfill these three 
functions: it will not be able to devise psychological operation plans; 
it will not be able to work on National Security Policy; it will not be 
able to devise plans on mobilization and war preparations. The NSC 
Secretariat-General is attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. If the 
Prime Minister assigns it a task, it will fulfill it. Other than that, it 
never undertakes tasks on its own. How will decisions made at the 
NSC be followed to make sure that they are implemented?”254 
 
      In addition to general Kılınç, other high ranking military officials like General 
Aytaç Yalman, Commander of the Land Forces; General Şener Eruygur, Commander 
of the Gendarmerie; General Hurşit Tolon, Commander of the Aegean Army; and 
General Çetin Doğan, Commander of the First Army expressed their reservations about 
the process of reform frequently. Even the General Hilmi Özkök, the then Chief of the 
General Staff, known with his respect to the civilian rule and decision making, reflected 
his concerns about the NSC reforms by arguing that Turkey should reform its legal 
system to conform to the EU criteria without ignoring the republican characteristics of 
its state.255  Some reactions of the military members given above, shows the military’s 
initial objection to the reforms and implies its willingness to take action in order to 
prevent realization of reforms. It is because, according to the ‘logic of 
consequentialism’ dimension, the prerogatives enjoyed by the military in the political 
system were targeted by the EU. Under the previous power structure, the military was a 
dominant institutional actor which strongly influenced the civilian governments through 
various mechanisms. However, with the process of change initiated by the EU, it began 
to loose its special position and privileges. According to ‘rational institutionalism’, 
actors’ behaviors are dependent on their material utilities. Every institutional actor is 
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self interested and each of them acts in order to protect and maximize its material gains. 
Those initial reactions signify the attitude of the military in line with the LoC approach. 
However, although the Europeanization process was a serious threat to political powers 
of the military in Turkish political system, ‘rational institutionalist’ conception of LoC 
failed to theorize the behaviors of the armed forces with respect to the reforms. 
According to the LoC, we would expect the military to deploy any mechanism to 
influence the civilian government and block the Europeanization process in order to 
preserve its material utilities. In spite of its weakening power, the refrained from 
blocking the process. 
 
 It would be plausible to argue that, the reason behind the military’s reluctancy 
in preventing process of reform was its rhetorical commitment to modernization and 
Westernization.256 As indicated in the previous sections, Turkish military has always 
regarded itself as the guardian of secularism, democracy and Westernization in Turkey. 
Turkish armed forces has always been the constant follower of Ataturk’s objective to 
reach modern civilizations level. Hence, the European Union was the embodiment of 
values like democracy, secularism, Westernization, and modern civilization embraced 
by the military. Under such conditions, military could not take action against reforms. 
Because reforms were demanded by the EU and the EU membership was the ultimate 
goal for Turkish modernization process where Atatürk and Turkish people wanted 
Turkey to reach. In other words, any military objection to further democratization 
would undermine the military’s legitimacy in the eyes of vast majority who supported 
Turkey’s bid for EU membership and consolidation of democracy. As Sarıgil states, 
“by accepting the reforms, which reduced its own powers, the military tried to avoid 
‘blame’ for blocking further democratization in the country and further integration with 
the EU. That is, the military shaped its actions according to the norms and values 
shared by the majority of the public. The possibility of being shamed by the civilian 
actors in case of blocking reforms; in other words, the generals’ concern for the 
legitimacy and credibility of the military was the major factor which resulted in change 
in the attitude of the military towards the government. Therefore, in the case of Turkish 
military, the ‘logic of appropriateness’(Type I), which argued that behaviors do not 
necessarily reflect preferences and expectations in terms of material utilities but rather 
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certain ideational interests derived from collective understandings, has outweighed the 
LoC.        
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CONCLUSION: FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE TURKEY’S EU 
MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
4.1. Future of the Civil-Military Relations  
 
 As seen from the preceding analysis, Turkey’s EU candidacy and the 
subsequent process of reform have had significant repercussions over the civil military 
relations. In this sense, it would be possible to argue that, as the democratization and 
civilianization in the context of Europeanization continues, the military will be subject 
to more pressure to be more transparent and accountable to the public.257 That is, the 
prospect for increased democratic civil-military relations in Turkey’s future has been 
enhanced with EU candidacy. However, as some scholars argue, there are some 
limitations to the impacts of the institutional changes over the role of the military in the 
political scene.258 According to this view, despite the fact that the military has not 
blocked limitation of its power in some areas and has allowed civilian government to 
enjoy a degree of democratic control over the armed forces, it still considers itself as 
the guardian of Kemalist principles and values. This situation proposes that, the 
military will insist on retaining a certain degree of autonomy over the issues that are 
deemed as vitally important for national security and its own interests. For instance, as 
it is mentioned above, the military has not stepped back from its stance about the 
accountability of the chief of staff to the prime minister, not the ministry of defense. 
Although this situation has been criticized on various occasions by the EU, the military 
rejects implementing EU’s demands due to strategic reasons.  
 
    Some scholars, like Michaud-Emin, argue that, the military’s “main source of 
power comes not from its legal status, but rather, its ultimate strength lies in its 
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informal means of power and influence over society and politics.”259 This idea suggests 
that, complete disappearance of the military from the political arena and the 
establishment of a democratic political system would be possible only if institutional 
changes are accompanied with an overall evolutionary process of cultural change 
within the Turkish society. To illustrate, when the composition of the NSC was 
changed and the civilian majority in the Council was actualized with an amendment to 
Article 118 of the constitution, it was argued that the power of the military and its 
dominance in decision making process in the Council were weakened. Although it was 
an important step to undermine the political role of the military, the impact of this 
amendment would not be as much as initially predicted, because “the political power of 
the military members of the NSC appeared to depend, not on their numbers, but the 
high regard in which they were still held by most of the public.”260 This meant that, 
regardless of their numerical supremacy, politicians would not dare to defend an 
opinion that is not shared by the military members. That is why the then Chief of Staff 
Huseyin Kıvrıkoğlu stated that, “if they want 100 civilians as members of the NSC, so 
be it,”261 meaning that this would not make much difference. Therefore, in order to 
introduce a lasting democratization in the civil-military relations and to establish a 
stronger civilian role, institutional changes need to be accompanied with a deeper 
change in the traditional, historical and cultural tenets that legitimize the military’s 
interventions in politics in the eyes of other actors. As Cizre highlights, mere 
institutional reform of civil-military relations would fail to identify and respond to an 
underlying web of unspoken and maybe invisible systems of sustenance that legitimize 
the military’s ability to influence.262 As democratic control of the armed forces “is 
about creating a new military culture with a newly instilled respect for civilian control 
where the ideological and historical underpinnings of the power relationship must 
undergo substantial change, what is required is more than just a list of institutional 
reforms, amendments to existing laws, and the constitution or promulgation of new 
laws.”263 Here, institutional change domain of Europeanization should be 
complemented by the norm diffusion domain through which the prevailing public 
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philosophy would be changed rendering civilian governments capable of taking control 
over not only military, but also other domains of the public life, such as, the economy, 
political process, institutional make-up, justice system and foreign relations. 
Empowerment of political, civil and economic society is seen as the essential stage in 
creating a political climate where the military considers subordination to civilian 
authority as the only justified course of action.264 
 
 
4.2. Possible Obstacles Facing Turkey 
 
 For Turkey, the aspiration to become an EU member has been the most 
influential catalysts in the reform process. Turkey’s candidacy status was granted in 
1999 Helsinki European Council Summit. In 2001, Turkey announced its National 
Program for the adoption of the ‘Acquis Communautaire’, and started her efforts to 
meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Subsequently, significant reforms were adopted in the 
areas of democracy, human rights, minority rights, rule of law, and individual liberties. 
Consequently, at the Brussels Summit of December 16-17, 2004, it was considered that 
Turkey had ‘sufficiently’ fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria.265 Despite the fact that 
Turkey had been successful in meeting the Copenhagen political criteria decisions taken 
at the Brussels Summit included some special clauses that were not mentioned in the 
previous rounds of the European enlargement. It was declared that if Turkey fails to 
maintain progress in undertaking reforms and fulfilling membership criteria, the EU 
would decide to suspend negotiations. In other words, the nature of negotiations is 
‘open-ended’. There is also the possibility of permanent restrictions, after the realization 
of full membership, in the areas of free movement of persons, structural policies and 
agriculture. Thus, unlike other candidate countries, which were promised to integrate in 
the Union immediately after the negotiations ended successfully, Turkey’s future with 
regard to membership is bleak. 
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Military’s privileged role in politics has been one of the most serious problems 
that attracted EU’s attention. On a number of different occasions, the EU affirmed that 
Turkey’s entry into the Union would be jeopardized if the military retains its supra-
active role in politics. Krisztina Nagy, the EU’s enlargement spokeswoman stated that, 
“if Turkey wants to be a member state, it has to be clear that civilian authorities have 
control of the military and not the other way around.”266 Despite the fact that the latest 
reforms in regard to armed forces have satisfied the EU, it is always made known by the 
EU that failure in implementing these reforms or return of the military into the political 
arena would result in suspension of the negotiations. Furthermore, civil-military 
relations is not the only issue which would lead to emergence of unexpected obstacles 
in the accession negotiations. Issues like Cyprus problem, Aegean Sea problem with 
Greece, so-called genocide problem with Armenia, Kurdish minority problem, 
reconstruction of Northern Iraq would give birth to unwanted clashes between the EU 
and Turkey. 
 
Although the accession negotiations were launched, it was foreseen that 
Turkey’s negotiations with the EU would be highly politicized because of the fact that 
negotiations are closely related with the unresolved issues.267 This predicted disharmony 
occurred in the very beginning of the accession negotiations. The first chapter of the 
accession negotiations, opened and closed provisionally, was the Science and Research 
Chapter. From the Turkish party’s perspective, Science and Research Chapter was 
supposed to be one of the least controversial chapters. However, the Republic of Cyprus 
contested the opening of the first chapter by arguing that, negotiations on the first 
chapter should be blocked until the Republic of Cyprus was recognized formally by 
Turkey.268  The Republic of Cyprus was convinced by the declaration of the EU foreign 
ministers which stated that, “failure to implement its [Turkey’s] obligations in full will 
affect the overall process in the negotiation.”269 Hence, in the very beginning of the 
accession negotiations, it was clearly understood that Turkey’s integration into the 
Union would be more complex and different than other rounds of expansion due to 
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Turkey’s characteristics and problems peculiar to its case. Although the first chapter on 
Science and Research is opened and closed provisionally, there are still eight chapters 
suspended by the EU because of the fact that Turkey has not allowed the Republic of 
Cyprus’ ships and planes to dock in Turkish ports. In this sense, one would argue that 
these highly sensitive unresolved issues from Cyprus to civil-military relations would 
make the negotiations process more grueling and longer than it had been expected.   
 
 An illustration of how Turkey’s process falls behind other applications is 
possible when compared to Croatia. Croatia, which began accession negotiations at the 
same time with Turkey, has already opened eighteen chapters. Furthermore, Croatia is 
expected to be a full member of the Union not later than 2010.270 On the other hand, 
Turkey has managed to open six chapters until now, and only one of them was 
provisionally closed. In addition to these, European Commissioner for Enlargement, 
Olli Rehn, has declared that, he expected Turkey to join the EU in ten – fifteen years 
time provided that she maintained reforms resolutely.271 It is safe to argue that, the 
launch of the accession negotiations is a milestone event for Turkey in regard to her 
dream about full membership; however, the presence of the aforementioned issues 
combined with the Justice and Development Party’s lack of concentration on accession 
negotiations for the last two years have reversed the wind of optimism about Turkey’s 
future. 
 
As the possibility of EU membership has become closer than ever, Turkish 
government decided to take action not only in the fields of domestic issues but also 
foreign policy areas. Until the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Greece had been one of the most 
important obstacles in front of Turkey’s membership application for the EU. However, 
after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (head of the separatist Kurdish guerrilla 
organization – PKK) in 1999, Turkey and Greece began to establish more cooperative 
relations especially in the fields of regional security and terrorism. Moreover, in 1999 
both countries were hit by earthquakes. This situation paved the way to an ‘earthquake 
diplomacy’ which has helped soften relations between the countries. Hence, these 
positive developments in terms of relations and the discourse used by both governments 
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signifies a strong potential for the extension of regional cooperation in the Aegean Sea 
and for the normalization of relations between two traditionally conflicting countries. 
However, although Greece’s stance towards Turkey has changed after the so-called 
‘earthquake diplomacy’ and Greece has openly started to support the EU membership of 
Turkey, there are a series of unresolved diplomatic issues between Greece and Turkey. 
These could be summarized as: i) the presence or absence of gray zones in the Aegean 
Sea, ii) sovereignty problems over many islands of the Aegean Sea, iii) airspace 
violations and unauthorized naval exercises.272 It is possible to argue that thanks to good 
relations these disputes have been kept out of limelight for the last years. Yet, this does 
not necessarily mean that the Aegean disputes would not come to the forefront and rock 
the apparently stable good relations  
 
In addition to this, after Helsinki Summit, Turkish government has taken 
significant steps in regard to the Cyprus issue. According to the Article 6 of the 
negotiation framework approved on October 3, 2005, Turkey needs to ‘normalize 
relations with Cyprus’ so as to be a member of the Union. However, for Turkey, 
normalizing relations with Cyprus is a very controversial issue because ‘normalization’ 
in this context means de facto and de jure recognition of the Greek Cypriot 
administration in Southern Cyprus as the legitimate authority for the whole island under 
the name of the Republic of Cyprus. Until a comprehensive settlement is reached, the 
Republic of Cyprus would have an opportunity to use her veto card at the opening and 
closing of each of the remaining chapters. Besides aforementioned issues, Turkish 
government has also modified her conventional attitude towards Armenia and Iraq. 
 
 
4.3. Last Words 
  
 By attaining a candidacy status in the European Council’s Helsinki Summit in 
1999, Turkey has turned an important corner in its long standing walk to full 
membership. Subsequent process of reform in the areas where the EU had demanded 
improvements, gave way to opening of the accession negotiations between the EU and 
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Turkey.  An unprecedented process of constitutional and legal changes in a relatively 
short period of time testified a broad based political will for EU membership in Turkey. 
The main motivation in undertaking reforms, designed to reorient Turkish political 
structure in line with the EU demands, would be explained by borrowing the rationalist 
institutionalist’ understanding of ‘logic of consequentialism’ which gives priority to the 
actors’ utility concerns in making their minds. As an actor in the international arena, 
Turkey would like to benefit from the economic, social and political gains of being a 
full member of the EU. 
 
 Turkey’s process of institutional change would be analyzed through the 
‘Europeanization’ literature. ‘Europeanization’, conceptualized by Radaelli as the 
impact of European policy making on national policies and institutions of candidate and 
member states, draws the theoretical framework in explaining Turkey’s political 
reforms in the post-Helsinki era.273 With the Europeanization process Turkey has taken 
important steps in readjusting its political system in line with the EU’s democratic 
conditionalities. Although the ‘Europeanization’ has two main domains; namely the 
institutional change domain and the norm diffusion domain, ‘Europeanization’, in this 
thesis, is boiled down to the adaptation of institutional changes covering constitutional 
reforms and legislative changes. Verification of norm diffusion aspect of 
Europeanization literature needs another research which is out of the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
 One of the mostly affected actors from the Turkey’s ‘Europeanization’ process 
has been the military. Unlike the EU member states, due to its traditional and historical 
role as the guardian of the Turkish Republic, the military has had a privileged position 
in the political arena. However, its dominance in the civil-military relations has been 
challenged by the constitutional reforms that are adopted in order to empower civilians 
in the political arena and to bring the armed forces under control. Especially the 
amendments regarding the National Security Council have undermined the power base 
of the military, through which it has influenced the civilian rule directly. Other reforms 
in respect to freedom of expression, freedom of press, rule of law, cultural rights, and 
abolition of death penalty have signified an important disjunction from the authoritarian 
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understanding of the 1982 Constitution promulgated by the military rule after the 1980 
coup. Although the power and authority of the military has been challenged by these 
reforms, it did not block the process of reform through formal or informal mechanisms. 
As the heir of Atatürk’s modernization/Westernization ideal, the military could not 
block the reforms that are undertaken in order to reach the EU membership. Therefore, 
rather than the ‘logic of consequentialism’, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ was the main 
motive behind the military’s attitude towards the reform process. As Checkel argues, 
actors may behave appropriately by learning a role irrespective of whether their role 
contradicts with the material gains or loses.274 In order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of 
others, actors would play their roles instead of pursuing their own interests. In the same 
vein, it would be possible to argue that, although the military did not embrace the main 
motivation behind the reform process, it refrained from blocking this process due to its 
historical modernizer role within the Turkish society. 
 
 Despite the fact that the power of military in the political arena has been 
challenged by the institutional changes, without the diffusion of ideas which give 
credence to civilian rule and civilian supremacy vis-a-vis the armed forces, the military 
would return to the political sphere in the long run. This means that, the historical, 
cultural, and traditional tenets which legitimize the privileged position of the military in 
the Turkish political systems should be transformed. Otherwise, the civil-military 
relations in Turkey would come to forefront as a problematic issue throughout the 
accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey.       
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